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A General Look at General Jurisdiction
Lea Brilmayer,* Jennifer Haverkamp,** Buck Logan,**
Loretta Lynch,** Steve Neuwirth,** and Jim O'Brien***
In reviewing the constitutionality of state assertions of personal jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has recognized two types of jurisdiction-general and specific Con-
tacts between the defendant and the state that are not necessarily related to the suit
form the basis of general jurisdiction, while specific jurisdiction rests on contacts that
are either the direct cause of the action or at least related to the suit. The vast bulk of
recent scholarly and judicial attention has focused solely on the issue of specficjuris-
diction, leaving general jurisdiction a powerful yet largely unexplored theory.
Professor Brilmayer and her co-authors examine the theory of general jurisdic-
tion, its meaning and its rationales. They first discuss the traditional bases for general
jurisdiction: domicile and place of incorporation or principal place of business, defend-
ant'sforum activities, transient presence, consent, and property in the forum. As they
evaluate the rationales underlying each basis, they highlight recurrent themes and ana-
lyze forum contacts that support general jurisdiction. Finally, they explore the contacts
supporting general adjudicative jurisdiction that also justify legislative jurisdiction per-
mitting the court to apply the forum's substantive law to the dispute.
I. Introduction
Earl Cowan died on January 18, 1976, as a result of his injury in a
pickup truck accident in Cherokee County, Texas. Five years later, after
the two-year Texas statute of limitations had run, his widow filed suit
against Ford Motor Company and served its resident agent in Missis-
sippi, where the limitations period is six years. Mrs. Cowan was a resi-
dent of Texas, as her husband had been. Ford is incorporated in
Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Michigan.
Ford neither manufactured nor sold the truck in Mississippi. After it
received service of process, Ford filed a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction.'
Although these circumstances suggest the kind of tortuous hypo-
thetical that first-year law students confront on civil procedure exams,
they actually represent a typical scenario in litigation.2 In this scenario,
* Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976, University of
California, Berkeley; LL.M. 1978, Columbia University.
** J.D. 1987, Yale Law School.
* J.D. Candidate 1988, Yale Law School.
I. Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 694 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1982), question certified on reh'g,
713 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), district court rev'd & action remanded, 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983). For a
general discussion of Cowan's effects on Mississippi's exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents, see Recent Decisions, 53 Miss. L.J. 369 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979) (suit by a Kan-
sas plaintiff under Mississippi law against a defendant incorporated in Delaware and headquartered
in Wisconsin); Ratliffv. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.) (suit between residents of
Indiana and Florida and corporations headquartered in Connecticut and New York), cert. denied,
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a plaintiff seeks jurisdiction in a forum court over a claim unrelated to
activities in the forum. Such jurisdiction usually is called general juris-
diction, in contrast to specific jurisdiction, under which the claim is re-
lated to activities in the forum state.3 The Supreme Court voiced its
approval of general jurisdiction in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Min-
ing Co. 4 Finding that the defendant's forum activities were "continuous
and systematic,"' 5 the Court held that Ohio could assert jurisdiction over
a claim unrelated to those activities and brought by a nonresident plain-
tiff.6 The phrase "continuous and systematic" thereafter became the test
used by lower courts to evaluate assertions of general jurisdiction.7 In
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court
renewed its theoretical recognition of general jurisdiction, but held that
on the facts of the case an inadequate nexus existed to support
jurisdiction.8
These are the only two Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of
general jurisdiction since 1952. Although they provide some guidance,
the exact status and boundaries of general jurisdiction remain uncertain.
Lower courts, unable to ag-ree on the criteria establishing an adequate
basis for general jurisdiction, often reach discordant results.9 Commen-
tators have failed to clarify the issue; apparently, until quite recently, no
one had devoted an article exclusively to general jurisdiction. 10
404 U.S. 948 (1971). For a list of case citations, see R. CASAD, JURISDIrTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
S 3.02[2][a], at 3-65 n.274 (1983).
3. This terminology originated in von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-45 (1966).
4. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
5. Id. at 438. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the defendant, a Philippine
corporation, carried on its entire wartime activity in Ohio, including directors' meetings, business
correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payments of salaries, and purchasing of machinery. See id.
at 447-48.
6. Id. at 448.
7. See, eg., Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mex., 729 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1984);
Bucks County Playhouse v. Bradshaw, 577 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
8. 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). The Helicopteros suit arose out of a helicopter crash in Peru that
killed four United States citizens, none of them Texas residents. The victims were employees of a
Peruvian consortium composed of two Texas corporations and a Delaware corporation. The defend-
ant, a Peruvian corporation, had contracted with the consortium to provide transportation. The
defendant's contacts with Texas included negotiating the contract in Houston, Texas, purchasing
most of its helicopters and parts in Tex.as, accepting as payment checks from Texas banks, leasing a
helicopter through a Texas bank, and training and keeping some employees in Texas on a regular
basis. Id. at 409-12.
9. See R. CASAD, supra note 2, 3.02[2][a], at 3-65 & n.274.
10. Discussions of general jurisdiction, however, do appear in articles addressing a broad range
of jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., id. 1 1.01-.08 (outlining fundamental concepts of jurisdiction);
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUp. CT.
REV. 77, 80-82 [hereinafter Brilmayer. How Contacts Count] (explaining bases for general jurisdic-
tion); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136-44 (discussing jurisdiction in claims unrelated
to forum activities in the context of "directly affiliating circumstances"). For an excellent recent
article exclusively addressed to general jurisdiction, see Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
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General Jurisdiction
One reason for this lack of attention may be that general jurisdiction
is now of less practical importance than it once was. Historically, courts
commonly predicated jurisdiction upon the defendant's general affilia-
tion with the forum, and not the defendant's activities in the forum that
were related to the litigation.1  Thus, presence in the forum, doing busi-
ness in the forum, and domicile in the forum were the important bases
for jurisdiction.1 2 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,13 however,
the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the constitutional approach
to personal jurisdiction. The Court's holding enabled a state to reach
outside its boundaries and compel an absent defendant to defend a claim
that arose in the forum.14 After International Shoe, plaintiffs no longer
must chase defendants to their home states to obtain jurisdiction over
them. 15
Nonetheless, general jurisdiction is not on its way to extinction.
Often, plaintiffs prefer to chase defendants to their home states. As our
initial example Cowan v. Ford Motor Co. 1 6 illustrates, a plaintiff may seek
the application of a distant forum's law because it is more favorable than
the law of the state where the cause of action arose. 17 Such forum shop-
ping is a persistent problem in general jurisdiction cases,18 given current
minimal restraints on a state's choice of law. 19
101 HARV. L. REv. 610 (1988). For a response to Professor Twitchell's arguments, see Brilmayer,
Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. Rav. 1444 (1988).
11. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905);
see also Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clauses and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958) (relating historical accounts of jurisdiction).
12. See Kurland, supra note 11, at 569-74 (analyzing the various early bases for jurisdiction).
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. See id. at 321.
15. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1128.
16. 694 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1982) question certified on reh'g, 713 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), district
court rev'd & action remanded, 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983).
17. Other factors also may cause a plaintiff to seek general jurisdiction over a defendant in a
state other than where the claim arose. For example, a plaintiff might prefer to litigate in the de-
fendant's home state when it is also the plaintiff's home state or when no other forum is available.
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
18. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 792 (10th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff
taking advantage of the forum's longer statute of limitations); Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520
S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (same); see also Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773 (1984) (stating, in a specific jurisdiction case, that the
place where the plaintiff filed suit "was the only state where [plaintiff's] suit would not have been
time-barred when it was filed").
19. A decision to apply a particular state's substantive law will be unconstitutional only if the
choice of that state's law is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, based on an assessment of the aggrega-
tion of contacts between the parties, the occurrence, and the state. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). The Hague decision indicates that a state's choice of law decision will
receive only minimal constitutional scrutiny. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 9.2A, at 525-27 (3d ed. 1986). The application of constitutional limits on choice of law in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985), however, may indicate the beginning of
greater scrutiny. Several commentators have discussed the constitutional limits on choice of law.
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We will explore two questions tied to the forum-shopping problem.
First, what should be the appropriate standard for determining whether
general jurisdiction exists? This question breaks down into a series of
subissues. When must a court rely on general rather than specific juris-
diction? In other words, when is the controversy unrelated to the forum?
Are the types of contacts that are relevant to general jurisdiction differ-
ent from the types that are relevant to specific jurisdiction? If so, then
how do the two contacts inquiries differ?
The second question relates to choice of law. How are general and
specific jurisdiction different for choice-of-law purposes? This question
also generates more narrow questions. Why is forum shopping more of a
problem when the plaintiff relies on unrelated contacts to establish gen-
eral legislative jurisdiction--the power of the forum to apply its own sub-
stantive law? Under what circumstances will a finding of general
adjudicative jurisdiction also satisfy the constitutional tests for legislative
jurisdiction?
We examine first the meaning of general jurisdiction and the ways in
which it may be established. We then address the choice-of-law implica-
tions of general jurisdiction. With such a general look at the subject, we
can do little more than raise interesting questions, highlighting and rede-
fining the central issues. Definitive resolution of these issues is nearly
impossible, given the incomplete state of current doctrine. Nevertheless,
we will suggest theoretical limitations on the reach of general
jurisdiction.
These theoretical limitations result from basic premises of political
philosophy. Adjudicative jurisdiction is one way in which the state as-
serts coercive power over individuals. Consequently, the legitimacy of a
particular assertion of state power is always an issue. Of the various jus-
tifications for the exercise of state power, two, in particular, are relevant
to the question of adjudicative jurisdiction. The first is the notion that a
state's special relationship with those that have a right to influence state
decision making justifies the assertion of state power over those individu-
als or entities. The second is the idea that a state may exercise authority
over activities occurring within its territory. The former justification
See, e.g., Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: A Dismal Prospect,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 907, 916 (1981); Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportunity Lost, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 195, 201 (1982); Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of
Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 74 (1982); von Mehren & Trautman, Constitu-
tional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 37, 39 (1982);
Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?, 10 HOESTRA L. REV. 17,
34 (1982). In a recent article, Professor Kogan argues that fairness to litigants should be the primary
constitutional limitation. See Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of
Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. 'EV. 651, 689-700 (1987).
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General Jurisdiction
supports general jurisdiction while the latter buttresses specific jurisdic-
tion. We argue that the contours of these two justifications establish the
outer limits of general and specific jurisdiction.
II. The Nature and Existence of General Jurisdiction
What difference does it make whether we characterize assertion of
state judicial power as specific or general? Differentiating between the
two is crucial for one important reason: fewer contacts-perhaps only
one-will support specific jurisdiction.20 In contrast, the Supreme
Court's opinions in Perkins21 and Helicopteros22 suggest that assertions
of general jurisdiction require a larger number of contacts. Plaintiffs
usually benefit from arguing that the cause of action arises out of or is
related to the defendant's contacts because the jurisdictional threshold is
lower. Because in many cases there will only be contacts that are not
continuous and substantial, whether jurisdiction exists at all will depend
on the type of jurisdiction the plaintiff asserts.
Von Mehren and Trautman offer the following observations in dis-
tinguishing the two types of jurisdiction:
[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy
normally support only the power to adjudicate.., issues deriving
from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes ju-
risdiction .... This we call specific jurisdiction. On the other
hand, American practice for the most part is to exercise power to
adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on
relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the person
or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we call gen-
eral jurisdiction. 23
General jurisdiction rests upon a direct relationship between the defend-
ant and the forum and does not differentiate between the various causes
of action that the plaintiff may assert against the defendant. Once
shown, general jurisdiction establishes forum adjudicative power over
any controversy involving that defendant. Specific jurisdiction, in con-
trast, depends on a connection between the defendant, the forum, and the
particular litigation.24
While their distinction is enormously helpful, von Mehren and
Trautman do not specify which contacts might support general jurisdic-
20. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding jurisdic-
tion based on insurance contract made by mail with a forum resident, defendant's sole contact with
the forum).
21. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
22. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984).
23. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136.
24. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 80-81.
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tion and which might establish specific jurisdiction. Their distinction
rests more on intuition than analysis. Spelling out the difference more
precisely, however, is no easy matter. An examination of the paradigms
of general jurisdiction's bases--domicile, place of incorporation, and
principal place of business--will illuminate the underlying rationales for
each type of jurisdiction we discuss. We characterize these paradigms as
unique affiliations-those that the defendant has with only one state.
A. Unique Affiliations
1. Domicile.-Domicile is the place with which a person has a set-
tled connection for certain legal purposes, either because the person's
home is there or because the law assigns this significance to that place.25
Many legal functions-taxation, probate, divorce, and adoption-require
factual findings of domicile for an exercise of jurisdiction over the
party.26 "Every person ha: a domicile at all times, and at least for the
same purpose, no person has more than one domicile at a time."' 27 A
state has a special relationship 28 with its domiciliaries that justifies the
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1969). Holmes defined domi-
cile as "the one technically pre-eminent headquarters, which... every person is compelled to have in
order that by aid of it certain rights and duties which have been attached to it by the law may be
determined." Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 157, 51 N.E. 531, 532
(1898).
Domicile is not merely residence, although courts and legislatures often confuse the two con-
cepts or use them interchangeably. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-17 (1981)
(discussing party's residence, but not domicile, in determining contacts with state); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (stating that "the fact that one is a soldier or sailor does not deprive
him of the right to change his residence or domicile"). Although courts recognize that the concepts
differ, see Note, Martinez v. Bynum and Residency Requirements for Free Public Education, 26
ARIz. L. REv. 729, 730 (1984), one must examine closely the factors a court discusses to determine
whether the court is describing residency or domicile.
26. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 362 (West 1972) (providing that a foreign will is valid accord-
ing to the law of the place where the testator was domiciled at the time of death); N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
L. & R. 302(b) (Consol. 1983) (matrimonial long-arm statute allowing jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant, provided that New York was the matrimonial domicile before separation); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 100 (Vernon 1986) (providing specific grounds for contesting a foreign will based on
the existence of domiciliary or nondomiciliary jurisdiction).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CIF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1969).
28. This relationship is demonstrated in the Supreme Court decisions in suits over durational
residency requirements. The Court repeatedly has held that when a state grants benefits to or ex-
tracts duties from its domiciliaries, it must do so without regard to length of residence, although the
state may impose a reasonable waiting period for administrative purposes before extending these
benefits. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974) (holding a dura-
tional residency requirement to be an improper basis for denying indigents nonemergency medical
care); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441. 452-53 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a durational residency
requirement that prohibited out-of-state students from becoming residents for tuition purposes while
they attended the state university); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 352 (1972) (stating that a
durational residency requirement is permissible only to prevent voter fraud, not to keep new resi-
dents from voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (holding a durational residency
requirement to be an improper basis for denying welfare benefits); see also Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.
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General Jurisdiction
state's exercise of judicial and regulatory authority over these residents.2 9
Indeed, most courts treat as self-evident the state's right to subject domi-
ciliaries to the jurisdiction of its courts. 30
A person legally acquires this unique relationship with the domicili-
ary state by operation of law31 or by choice. 32 Because most adults
choose their domicile, domicile of choice is the most important type. A
person establishes a domicile of choice through physical presence in a
new location and an intent to make the place home, at least for the
time. 33 The presence requirement, although it seems to be of only evi-
dentiary value, "may have originated in a felt need for the individual to
be within the physical power of the state before subjecting him to its
legislative or judicial jurisdiction. 34 Thus, the remaining element of
domicile of choice-subjective intent to make the state a legal home-
becomes the essential determination for domicile.35 Of course, if a find-
ing of domicile depends solely on state of mind, we might expect litigants
to profess an intent compatible with the particular benefit or burden that
accompanies such a finding. For example, one predictably would express
a different domiciliary intent when seeking in-state tuition at a state uni-
versity than when seeking to escape a state's jurisdiction. Consequently,
courts review actions that manifest the requisite domiciliary intent rather
than relying on a person's self-interested profession. 36
Although a test focusing on objective facts may establish domicile
on a common-sense level, domicile remains an ambiguous legal doctrine.
Thus, courts determine domicile in different ways37 and consider a vari-
ety of factors when deciding whether a party's conduct demonstrates the
degree of intent necessary to establish a new domicile.38
Supp. 1211, 1215 (D.N.H.) (considering durational residency requirement to be appropriate for can-
didates seeking public office), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
29. See, eg., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n,
286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932); Maguire v. Trefrey, 253 U.S. 12, 15 (1920).
30. See, eg., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (concluding summarily that a state
may exercise authority over its own citizens).
31. The law assigns a domicile to certain classes of persons regarded as incapable of choosing a
domicile. Children receive the domicile of their parents, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 22 (1969), as do incompetent persons, id. § 23.
32. See id. § 15.
33. See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974); Lea v.
Lea, 18 N.J. 1, 11, 112 A.2d 540, 545 (1955); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 791-92, 8 S.E. 596,
597 (1888); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15-16, 18 (1969).
34. Note, Domicil of Refugees, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 640, 643 n.19 (1942).
35. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, §§ 2.4-.11 (discussing various issues that arise
from inquiries into domiciliary intent).
36. See, e.g., Mas, 489 F.2d at 1400; Lea, 18 N.J. at 11, 112 A.2d. at 545; White, 31 W. Va. at
791-92, 8 S.E. at 597.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 27-30 (1969).
38. For example, a court might consider
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Texas Law Review
Domicile is traditionally the strongest basis supporting general juris-
diction over a party. Domicile provides such a strong foundation for the
imposition of general personal jurisdiction because it typically satisfies
four of the major theoretical justifications for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion: convenience for the defendant, convenience for the plaintiff, power,
and reciprocal benefits.
(a) Convenience Jfr the defendant.-Presumably, the domi-
ciles of the parties to a suit would provide forums convenient to them.
Defendants, especially, would seem to benefit from a rule basing jurisdic-
tion upon domicile.39 Of course, this generalization is not always true; a
defendant might be away from home for a long period of time or might
move to another state after commencement of a suit.4° Furthermore, as
the Supreme Court emphasized in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, jurisdiction may be inappropriate even when a defendant suf-
fers relatively little inconvenience. 41 We must seek, therefore, additional
explanations for the use of domicile as a basis of general jurisdiction.
(b) Convenience for the plaintiff.-For the convenience of
plaintiffs, general jurisdiction should exist somewhere in order "to pre-
serve some place where the defendant can be sued on any cause of ac-
tion." 42 In light of this policy, von Mehren and Trautman conclude that
general jurisdiction should be narrowly available and tied closely to dom-
icile.43 The domicile test theoretically enhances convenience to the plain-
tiff by providing one sure forum in which to sue the defendant. But
domicile is not always mechanically ascertainable. In our increasingly
mobile society, people not only relocate more often and for a broader
array of reasons, but frequently do so with less certainty that they will
the paying of taxes and statemcnts on tax returns; the ownership of property; where the
person's children attend school; the address at which one receives mail; statements as to
residency contained in contracts or other documents; statements on licenses or governmen-
tal documents; where furniture znd other personal belongings are kept; which jurisdiction's
banks are utilized; membership in professional, fraternal, religious or social organizations;
where one's regular physicians and dentists are located; where one maintains charge ac-
counts; and any other facts revealing contact with one or the other jurisdiction.
Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 499, 325 A.2d 392, 397 (1974).
39. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 4.33, at 213; cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987) (denying jurisdiction in part because of the burden a Japanese
defendant faces in litigating in California).
40. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 459 (1940) (absent defendant was sued at his
domicile while he was residing in a different state); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433
(1932) (defendant, while living in France, was sued at his domicile).
41. 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
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General Jurisdiction
remain in a new home.44 Such uncertainty for an intention-based domi-
cile test thwarts the effort to provide a plaintiff with a simple, reliable
place to sue.
Even if we overcome the definitional problems with a domicile stan-
dard, assigning jurisdiction based on the coincidence of domicile presents
implementation problems. Assume Smith is domiciled in New York
when she runs over Jones, domiciled in Connecticut. Smith then moves
to California and establishes her domicile there. Where should Jones file
suit? One might assume that Jones should file in the state where Smith
was domiciled when the cause of action arose because this would not
subject Jones to the vagaries of Smith's later change in domicile. But
from a practical view, Smith is now a domiciliary of California, and a suit
filed in Connecticut would not serve Smith's convenience. Clearly, the
concept of domicile does not serve the convenience-to-the-plaintiff pur-
pose of jurisdiction to the extent that it arbitrarily adopts time limits on
determining domicile.
(c) Power.-In essence, the power rationale for an assertion of
general jurisdiction relies on practical considerations. For the forum
state meaningfully to adjudicate the rights of any party, the state must be
able to compel the appearance of defendants in its courts and exercise
power over them sufficient to enforce its judgments.45 States may obtain
jurisdiction over defendants as long as they are subject to the state's
physical power. A state derives its physical power from its status as an
independent sovereign, which possesses and imposes authority over per-
sons and property within its borders. 46 Because a state's authority over a
particular person is commensurate with its general territorial limitations,
the state may subject persons that occupy its land to its physical power.
Domiciliaries, therefore, are particularly amenable to the state's jurisdic-
tion.47 The Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington rec-
44. Cf. Holmes v. Sopuch, 639 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that a Missouri citizen
studying at Ohio State University and intending to stay in Ohio only while his studies required it did
not acquire an Ohio domicile); Elwert v. Elwert 196 Or. 256, 265, 248 P.2d 847, 851 (1952) (holding
that an Idaho divorce was null and void because the husband, who lived in Idaho for 10 months, was
not an Idaho resident when he filed for divorce).
45. Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 439-40 (1932) (stating that the necessity of a
state to compel an appearance of the defendant justifies contempt finding when the defendant resid-
ing abroad fails to answer a subpoena).
46. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
47. Plaintiffs, in comparison, submit to the laws and authority of a state by choosing to bring
suit in its courts. See, eg., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) ("The plaintiff having, by his
voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for all purposes for
which justice to the defendant requires his presence.").
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ognized physical power as 1he traditional basis for jurisdiction.48
The power rationale presents several problems. First, its worth as a
measure of constitutional due process has given way to an approach cen-
tered on fairness to the defendant.49 Second, other jurisdictional bases,
such as the presence of defendants or their property, are more likely than
domicile to confer power over the defendant. Finally, the state's power
over a domiciliary may depend upon whether sister states will enforce its
judgment;50 if the state of domicile renders judgment against a domicili-
ary absent from the state, a sister state will enforce that judgment only if
the rendering state had constitutional jurisdiction over the defendant.51
The power rationale, therefore, results in unavoidable circularity: a state
has power and thus jurisdiction over an absent defendant domiciliary
only if sister states will enforce the judgment, which sister states will do
only if the first state had jurisdiction.
(d) Reciprocal benefits and burdens.-Domicile creates a
unique relationship between the domiciliary and the forum state, a rela-
tionship composed of the benefits provided to the domiciliary and the
burdens imposed by the state in consideration for those benefits. If a
state finds that Smith is a domiciliary, that state determines the validity
of Smith's marriage, divorcs, will, and custody rights. It has administra-
tive authority over her estate, can impose inheritance and income taxes,
and can subject her to the state's judicial processes and rules for any
claims against her. The state, on the other hand, must extend certain
benefits to her, including the right to vote, education (when other locals
are granted such benefits), and in-state tuition. She is eligible to run for
office, and the state cannot deny her general welfare and medical assist-
ance. The state can extract these special responsibilities from its domicil-
iaries even when they are absent from the state; for example, in Milliken
v. Meyer,5 2 the Court held that a state of domicile has general jurisdiction
over an absent domiciliary if the domiciliary has received notice of the
48. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (referring to
physical power as the "foundation of jurisdiction").
49. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 4.8, at
118 (stating that International Shoe established a "jurisdictional standard of fairness to the
defendant").
50. The full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, requires states to give to the
judgments of sister states the same effect that such judgments have in the state of rendition. Morris
v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 551 (1947); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 com-
ment b (1969); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (requiring federal courts to give full faith and credit
to state court judgments).
51. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 4.3, at 94.
52. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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General Jurisdiction
suit53 adequate to conform with "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice... implicit in due process."'54 The Court's discussion of
the relationship between notice and fairness later provided the basis for
International Shoe's introduction of a minimum contacts approach to ju-
risdiction. 5 Although the Court recognized a state's physical power as
the historical basis for general jurisdiction, its new approach signaled an
important theoretical shift in explaining how a state obtains jurisdiction
over persons.
One benefit that states regularly confer is the right to vote. The
right to vote gives domiciliaries the chance to influence local political
processes. When a state applies its long-arm statute to attain jurisdiction
over a domiciliary, it simply requires the domiciliary to adhere to a local
law that theoretically the party had a chance to influence. For this rea-
son, domicile is different from other bases for general jurisdiction, all of
which raise the question of the state's right to regulate outsiders that
have not had the opportunity to influence the legislative process. On
balance, the reciprocal benefits and burdens rationale provides the most
satisfactory basis for the state's exercise of coercive power.
2. Place of Incorporation and Principal Place of Business.-The
law treats corporations like legal -persons, and the place of incorporation
and the principal place of business are both analogous to domicile. In
some respects, the decision to incorporate in a particular state provides a
more powerful basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction than does domicile.
First, the corporation intentionally chooses to create a relationship with
the state of incorporation, presumably to obtain the benefits of that
state's substantive and procedural laws.56 Such a choice creates a unique
relationship that justifies general jurisdiction over the corporation.5 7
Second, the corporation, unlike an individual, cannot ever be absent from
the state of incorporation. Third, even if a corporation neither does busi-
ness nor maintains an office in the incorporating state, the incorporation
53. See id. at 462.
54. Id. at 463.
55. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding that constitutional
due process for jurisdiction requires that the defendant have "certain minimum contacts with [the
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice'" (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463)).
56. Cf Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEXAS L. REV. 469, 477 (1987) (suggesting that one school of thought, the corporate federalists,
would hold that corporations will incorporate in the "state providing the most efficient menu of legal
rules"). Empirical evidence has shown that companies are particularly sensitive to differences
among states' laws when deciding where to reincorporate. See Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 225, 265 (1985).
57. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 4.21.
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process itself provides notice of the potential for judicial jurisdiction. Fi-
nally, the corporation is likely to be familiar with that state's law, argua-
bly more familiar than an -individual domiciliary would be, because the
corporation presumably based its incorporation decision in part on the
state's substantive law. 58
Place of incorporation, however, is not the only affiliation that sup-
ports general jurisdiction; a corporation may do sufficient business
within a state to give the state general jurisdiction over it. Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 59 suggests two standards with which to
evaluate a corporation's doing business in a state. First, as discussed be-
low, 6° an absolute quantum, of activity in a forum may give rise to juris-
diction. Second, if the state is the corporation's principal place of
business, then a smaller quantum of activity may establish jurisdiction.
In Perkins, for example, the defendant had relocated its corporate head-
quarters to the forum, and its activities in the forum constituted its entire
wartime business. 61 The principal place of business standard may rest on
conceptual grounds similar to those supporting the state of incorporation
as a jurisdictional basis. This standard, however, incurs definitional and
functional problems of application similar to those occurring with the
domicile test.62 States may define the term "principal" differently 63 or
58. The major theories on selection of a state of incorporation rest on the premise that corpo-
rate managers base their decisions upon the states' various laws. The race-to-the-bottom theory
contends that corporate managers pnmarily look to a state with laws favorable to them and not to
shareholders. See Macey & Miller, supra note 56, at 474. The competing theory, proffered by the
law and economics movement, contends that corporate management searches for states with efficient
rules. See id. at 472. In particular, corporate management prefers Delaware's legal environment
both for the present structure of its rules and for its reliable promise that rules adopted in the future
will continue to be highly favorable. See id. at 471-72.
59. 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952).
60. See infra subpart II(B).
61. See 342 U.S. at 447-48.
62. The defendant's activities ma'y be spread over several states, making it difficult to determine
which state is its principal place ofbuiness. Cf Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485
n.28 (1985) (suggesting that the nature of a franchise agreement is such that no single corporate
headquarters is a principal place of business).
63. Some courts have held that the location of business supervision is sufficient to establish the
principal place of business. See, e.g., Tolchester Lines v. Dowd, 253 F. Supp. 643, 648 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (stating that principal place is. where the corporate officers spend the "great bulk of their
time"); Meyers v. Lux, 76 S.D. 182, 189, 75 N.W.2d 533, 537 (1956) (stating that the principal place
of business is where supervision occurs and books and records are kept). But see In re Evans, 12 F.
Supp. 953, 954 (W.D.N.Y. 1935) (stating that the "'principal place of business' is not necessarily
determined by the volume of business carried on"). Other courts have held that the corporate char-
ter identifies the principal place of business. See, e.g., Kane v. Universal Film Exchs., 32 Cal. App.
2d 365, 367, 89 P.2d 693, 694 (1939) (stating that the principal place of business cannot be estab-
lished unless the correctly filed corporate charter identifies it). But see In re Charmichael Enters.,
334 F. Supp. 94, 102 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (stating that the principal place of business would be in a
county other than the one specified in charter if business functions so indicated).
734
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General Jurisdiction
may determine that they provide benefits which are relatively more im-
portant to a particular corporation than those provided by other states.
3. Conclusion.-Domicile, place of incorporation, and principal
place of business are paradigms of bases for general jurisdiction. Unlike
other bases for general jurisdiction discussed below,64 these bases typi-
cally are unique. A corporation usually has one state of incorporation
and one principal place of business, and individuals have a single domi-
cile. In contrast, other bases, such as activities, presence, property, and
consent, may exist in any number of states for a single defendant. 65
Thus, we refer to domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of
business as unique affiliations, indicating that one state alone has that
relationship to the party. That these affiliations are unique may account
for the special constitutional status they historically have enjoyed; in-
deed, courts have taken their sufficiency as jurisdictional bases more or
less for granted. 66 We will discuss below 67 a considerably more contro-
versial point, namely the significance of unique contacts for choice-of-law
purposes. First, we must discuss other nonunique bases for general juris-
diction: activities in the state, presence, consent, and ownership of prop-
erty. Although many courts properly have relied on these for general
jurisdiction, they are not paradigm bases of general jurisdiction because
each also establishes specific jurisdiction in certain circumstances.
B. Activities
A defendant's activities in the forum can be the basis for either gen-
eral or specific jurisdiction. 68 One important practical implication fol-
lows from this fact: one must first determine whether the plaintiff alleges
these nonunique contacts in support of general or specific jurisdiction in
order to decide how many must be shown. The type of jurisdiction being
asserted sets the quantum of contacts required; a single activity may suf-
fice to establish specific jurisdiction, 69 whereas general jurisdiction re-
64. See infra subparts II(B)-(E).
65. For example, state long-arm statutes typically provide some basis of jurisdiction over a
defendant that contracts with state residents, see, eg., TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.044(b) (Vernon 1986); thus a basis for jurisdiction over a party conceivably exists in every state
in which the party contracts with a resident.
66. Twitchell, supra note 10, at 633 & n.I 11.
67. See infra Part III.
68. For example, in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952), general
jurisdiction was based on activities; in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945), specific jurisdiction was based on activities.
69. See, ag., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (finding that defendant's lone activity in the
state-using salesmen to solicit orders-supported jurisdiction over a claim related to that activity).
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quires proof of continuous and systematic activities.70  Determining
whether an activity invokes specific or general jurisdiction turns on the
difficult question of whether the activity is related to the controversy.71
This inquiry is unnecessary when the contact alleged in support of juris-
diction is either domicile or incorporation. Once the plaintiff has estab-
lished such a unique affiliation, the type of jurisdiction sought does not
matter because the affiliation clearly has shown the requisite level of
contact.
1. Substantive Relevance and Related Activities.-When defend-
ants have engaged in forum activities that are related to the controversy
or out of which the controversy arises, 72 plaintiffs usually seek specific
jurisdiction. In contrast, when plaintiffs seek general jurisdiction, they
may allege as a basis for jurisdiction activities unrelated to the dispute.
For instance, one standard basis for general jurisdiction has been the de-
fendant's doing business in the forum; 73 the Supreme Court in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., for example, predicated jurisdiction
upon the defendant's business activities in the forum.74
According to von Mehren and Trautman, specific jurisdiction is
"the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or con-
nected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate."' 75 A plaintiff can show specific jurisdiction with a small number of
contacts if they are related to the controversy, or if the controversy arises
out of the contacts. Givert that general jurisdiction requires a larger
number of contacts, determining whether activities are related or con-
nected in the appropriate sense becomes crucial. Resolution of the relat-
edness issue thus should precede an assessment of the contacts' quantity.
The vast bulk of commentary on jurisdictional due process, however, is
strangely silent on this issue .76
The Supreme Court likewise has been relatively unhelpful. While it
70. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1984)
(holding that continuous and systematic activities between the defendant and the forum were neces-
sary to establish jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those activities).
71. See L. BRILMAYER AND OTHERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERI-
CAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 22 (1986) [hereinafter L. BRILMAYER].
72. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
73. See, e.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 626, 626, 208 N.E.2d 439, 439, 255
N.Y.S.2d 671, 671 (1965). See generally Kurland, supra note 11, at 584 (analyzing the doing busi-
ness doctrine).
74. See 342 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1952).
75. von Mehren & Trautman, suora note 3, at 1136.
76. But see Richman, Part I-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, Part II-A Sliding Scale To
Supplement the Distinction Between G.tneral and Specific Jurisdiction (Review Essay), 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 1328, 1336-46 (1984) (discussing the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction and
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General Jurisdiction
has acknowledged the importance of the relation of the claim to the fo-
rum,7 7 the Court's opinions fail to describe exactly what type of related-
ness between the claim and the forum is necessary in order to establish
specific jurisdiction.78 Must the claim have arisen out of the defendant's
forum activities in a substantive law sense? Or is it sufficient if the forum
contacts are in some other way related or similar to the activities that
constitute the cause of action?79 Purportedly because the parties did not
argue the issue, the Helicopteros majority did not reach the question of
whether "a forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where
the cause of action 'relates to,' but does not 'arise out of,' the defendant's
contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific
jurisdiction." 80
Some courts have embraced the position that specific jurisdiction is
justified when the forum contacts are in some way related to or con-
nected with a claim, even though the cause of action did not arise out of
the defendant's forum activities. 81 For example, although the California
Supreme Court in Cornelison v. Chaney stated that the defendant's forum
contacts were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over a tort
claim, it nonetheless found "a substantial nexus between plaintiff's cause
of action and defendant's activities in California. ' 82 The accident oc-
curred while the defendant, a trucker, was en route to California, and he
arguing that more attention be paid to the relatedness of the defendant's contacts to the cause of
action).
77. See, eg., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
78. Cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 420 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court fails to distinguish controversies that relate to defendant's
contacts with the forum from disputes that arise out of such contacts).
79. For example, one approach uses a sliding scale between specific and general jurisdiction.
As related contacts become more attenuated, the level of the defendant's total forum contacts must
rise concomitantly. This type of jurisdiction, midway between specific and general jurisdiction, re-
quires contacts sufficient in their combined relatedness (although not related enough to establish
specific jurisdiction) and amount (although not enough to establish general jurisdiction) to create an
adequate nexus. See K. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 147 (1982); Richman, supra note 76, at
1336-45. Justice Brennan proposed such a sliding scale in his dissent in Helicopteros. See 466 U.S. at
425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 466 U.S. at 415 n.10. But cf. id. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that although
the claim did not arise out of forum activities, it was related to such activities and therefore the
activities should support specific jurisdiction).
81. See, e.g., Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that a malprac-
tice "claim arose out of or resulted from appellant's forum-related activities," which amounted to
minimal advertising and obtaining from the state a "Medi-Cal" number that enabled them to collect
fees); Southwire Co. v. Trans-World Metals & Co., 735 F.2d 440, 442 (11th Cir. 1984) (construing
"transacting business" requirement in a state long-arm statute liberally to include jurisdiction over
actions arising directly or indirectly out of transactions).
82. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 149, 545 P.2d 264, 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1976); see also Comment,
The Cornelison Doctrine: A New Jurisdictional Approach, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 458,460-69 (1977)
(discussing Cornelison's structure and application).
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Texas Law Review
carried on some other unrelated trucking activities there.8 3
Just what courts mean when they speak of this amorphous concept
of relatedness, however, is simply unclear. Practically any contact might
appear to be related to the cause of action and thus support specific juris-
diction. In short, such a vague term offers a state an apparently bound-
less jurisdictional reach-a result out of step with our notions of due
process. In Cornelison, would it have been enough that the defendant
once carried on trucking activities in the forum, or that it now carried on
a small bus charter operation? What if the driver had been planning to
drive to California three months hence? In what sense are the actual
contacts in Cornelison any more "related"?
A test of substantive relevance provides a different approach in dis-
cerning the boundary between specific and general jurisdiction. Sub-
stantive relevance finds that "[a] contact is related to the controversy if it
is the geographical qualification of a fact relevant to the merits. A forum
occurrence which would ordinarily be alleged as part of a comparable
domestic complaint is a related contact. '85 Some have criticized this ap-
proach as relegating the boundaries of jurisdiction to the vagaries of state
substantive law. 86 Yet these boundaries arguably should vary with state
law just as a particular cause of action will vary from state to state, and
whose variances are a well-accepted aspect of federalism.87 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in both Rush v. Savchuk 88 and Shaffer v. Heitner,89 while
83. See 16 Cal. 3d at 146-47, 545 P.2d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354. As one jurisdiction
aficionado described the connection in Cornelison, "a funny thing happened on the way to the fo-
rum." Conversation with Mark Gergen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Texas School
of Law (summer 1980).
84. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 82.
85. Id; see also Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Western Fin., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 843, 846
(W.D. Okla. 1977) ("The acts alleged to give rise to the cause of action must be the same acts which
provide the basis for the Oklahoma court's exercise ofjurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.").
86. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. For arguments that federalism should assume a larger role in determining limits on per-
sonal jurisdiction, see Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEXAs L. REv. 689 (1987).
88. 444 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1980) (observing that a direct action statute would make a defendant
amenable to suit while jurisdiction founded on the garnishment of an insurer's obligation to defend a
suit against its insured would not).
89. 433 U.S. 186, 214 (1977) (disallowing quasi in rem jurisdiction over corporate directors'
stock holdings "present" in Delaware, but suggesting that personal jurisdiction over the directors,
granted by a long-arm statute, would be constitutional). After Shaffer, Delaware enacted a long-arm
statute affording jurisdiction over directors of Delaware corporations, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3114 (Supp. 1986); the Delaware Supreme Court later upheld the statute as constitutional, Arm-
strong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 179 (Del. 1980). Shaffer is probably wrong to the extent that it
allows a state to alter the due process calculus simply by tinkering with its long-arm statute. See
Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79
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General Jurisdiction
disallowing jurisdiction, left open the door for each state to enact legisla-
tion that would create an adequate basis for jurisdiction-an even more
expansive route to a similar end. Moreover, Rush contains language sup-
porting a test of substantive relevance. 90
Any analysis of what activities, or contacts, should count towards
specific jurisdiction-and in effect weigh more heavily than those only
counting towards general jurisdiction-must rest on some underlying no-
tion of why relatedness should matter. For unique affiliations, the
strongest justification for a state's jurisdiction is the reciprocal benefits
and burdens that arise from the affiliation. 91 When a defendant has no
such affiliation with a forum, however, some other rationale for requiring
obedience to a state's coercive authority is needed.
One possibility lies in the state's authority to regulate occurrences
within its territory. Surely the state may condition entry into the state
upon willingness to comply with its laws. When an individual enters a
state and engages in tortious activities there, the state has an interest in
adjudicating the legality of the conduct. 92 Assertion of jurisdiction is a
rational means to that legitimate end. Whether the conduct is a criminal
or a civil wrong, the state reasonably may require the individual" to de-
fend a suit in the state and satisfy any judgment arising out of such a
transgression. For example, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,93
assertion of jurisdiction was a means toward collecting a tax that the
state arguably had a right to impose because the activities taxed were
local. The forum had a substantive interest to assert, and achieving this
interest was the goal of the litigation. 94
On the other hand, allowing a state to use innocent conduct within
the state as a pretextual basis for asserting power over conduct occurring
outside the state would not be reasonable. The state's interest in regulat-
ing activities in the state cannot justify predicating jurisdiction upon lo-
90. In Rush, the Court faced the question whether an insurer's obligation under its insurance
policy was related to the suit's cause of action, which arose out of an automobile accident. The
Court held that the policy was not related, noting that it was not part of the "operative facts of the
negligence action." 444 U.S. at 329. An amorphous test for relatedness probably would have found
the policy related. Indeed, prior to Rush several commentators had argued that an insurance policy
should be deemed related property. See Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Conse-
quences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031, 1038 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of
Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 426-33 (1978).
91. We have contended that the paradigm cases of general jurisdiction involve defendants that
are insiders who are entitled to all the benefits of membership in the forum, such as voting, educa-
tional benefits, and welfare. In such cases, it is reasonable to require defendants to comply with laws
that they theoretically have participated in making. See supra subsection II(A)(1)(d).
92. Cf R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 6.10 (discussing the interests of the state where the
tort occurred in applying its law to the case).
93. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
94. See id. at 311-12.
739


















l , i I t r ational Shoe Co. v. ashington,93
i ti n
l
l l. t ti i t t t t, i i t i




ti i i ti n 10
. , t t t ti t i ' li ti it i
li s r l t t t s it's s f ti , i r s t f t il i t.
t l t t t li t l t , ti t t it t t t r tive t t
li ce ti n." . . t . r t t f r r l t s r l l f
t li r l t . I , ri r t s s r l t t rs r t t i s r ce li
l i ial i iction -
f tT , ); tit tionality f
i r . t ft r tT r . it r, . . . , - ( ).
. t t t t i l j i i tion i l t t t
i i rs titl t ll t it i i t , ti ,
ti l it , l . , it i l t i ts t l it l
t t t t r ti ll rti i t i i . ra ti II( )(I)( ).
. j . , t , . i i t i t ts t t t t
t t i l i it l t t .
. . . 5).
. .
Texas Law Review
cal conduct that is not legally wrongful. The facts of Cornelison v.
Chaney95 well illustrate this point. California could not explain its asser-
tion of jurisdiction in terms of its interest in regulating local conduct
because the litigation was not an adjudication concerning the defendant's
local conduct. 96
A test of substantive relevance helps to identify those situations in
which the state is using the litigation to regulate local activity.97 Con-
duct that has no legal relevance is unlikely to give rise to any plausible
state interest in regulation. Consequently, if such legally irrelevant con-
duct is the only local contaft, then a state cannot predicate jurisdiction
upon any purported desire to regulate local activities. Moreover, this
perspective not surprisingly explains why the contours of local substan-
tive law might influence an assessment of the constitutionality ofjurisdic-
tion. Clearly, if one factor in the constitutional equation is the state's
interest in adjudication, 98 then asking whether the state has manifested
such an interest in its substantive law is both reasonable and desirable.
Perhaps we should emphasize what may already be obvious: the
inquiry into substantive relevance is not talismanic, but instead is a
means to a particular end-to determine whether entertaining the litiga-
tion would further the state's legitimate interests in local regulation. In
some unusual circumstances, a fact may be formally relevant to the sub-
stantive dispute but still not support a state interest. In others, it might
not be formally relevant, yet may establish an interest. Nevertheless,
substantive relevance is an important starting point for inquiring into a
state's interest. Acknowledging that an interest does exist, moreover,
will not ensure satisfaction of the due process clause; in some circum-
95. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264., 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
96. The cause of action in Cornelison involved a vehicle collision in Nevada between a defend-
ant from Nebraska and a plaintiff from California. Id. at 152-53, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at
357.
97. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 71, at 38 n.98.
98. In McGee v. International Li3e Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), the Court found that the
forum state's interest in providing effective means of redress to its residents when their insurers fail
to pay claims supported jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer. Similarly, the Court has recognized
that a state has a special interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts
within its territory. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (finding,
in a libel suit, jurisdiction based on circulation of a national magazine within the forum state). A
state's interest in protecting its residents does not always justify the exercise ofjurisdiction. See, eg.,
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (stating that the state's interest in protecting its
minor residents may favor application of that state's law, but it does not grant personal jurisdiction
over the defendant). A state's interest in adjudication nonetheless continues to be a consideration in
determining whether a state may exercise jurisdiction. For example, in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (197), the Court observed that California had little interest in
asserting jurisdiction to protect its resident because the resident had dropped out of the suit. The
court found that California had minimal legitimate interests, and it could not justify its assertion of
jurisdiction in a suit involving two foreign parties. See id. at 1034.
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General Jurisdiction
stances asserting that interest against a particular defendant may still be
unfair or unreasonable. 99
Ascertaining the distinction between related and unrelated contacts,
therefore, cannot answer all issues of jurisdictional due process. The dis-
tinction is only part of a threshold question to determine whether a small
number of contacts may suffice, as is the case in specific jurisdiction, or
whether the continuous and systematic contacts required for general ju-
risdiction are necessary. Even once we establish, by whatever test for
relatedness we choose, that the contacts in a particular case are unre-
lated, there remain important issues of how many and what kind of activ-
ities would make assertion of general jurisdiction fair.
2. Fairness and Unrelated Activities.-If, in a particular case, local
activities are unrelated to the litigation, and as a result, regulation of in-
state activities will not provide a basis for jurisdiction, then why should
the activities be relevant at all? Why and when should activities suffice
as a basis for general jurisdiction? We address this question by first re-
calling our paradigm bases of general jurisdiction: domicile, place of in-
corporation, and principal place of business. Under what circumstances
would unrelated activities present as good a justification for the assertion
of state power as would local domicile or incorporation? The answer
turns on the reasons given for finding domicile and incorporation to be
adequate bases in the first place.
Previously, we demonstrated that domicile, place of incorporation,
and principal place of business satisfy the theoretical justifications for
general jurisdiction.100 A substantial quantity of unrelated activities also
may satisfy these rationales: convenience to both the plaintiff and de-
fendant, power, and reciprocal benefits'and burdens. To the extent that
defending in one's domicile is convenient, litigating where one carries on
continuous and systematic activities is also likely to be convenient. Simi-
larly, allowing suit where the defendant is so engaged serves the plain-
tiff's convenience by providing a more definite forum; indeed, a test that
focuses on continuous and systematic activities eliminates the uncer-
tainty of proving which of several places is the defendant's principal
place of business. Most importantly, the reciprocal benefits rationale ob-
tains when the defendant carries out substantial activities, which impli-
cate the police powers and public facilities of the state.
99. See, eg., Kulko, 436 U.S. at 96-98 (finding unreasonable the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident father whose former spouse moved their children into the state, despite the state's inter-
est in the welfare of minor residents).
100. See supra subpart IH(A).
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The only difference between a defendant with substantial local activ-
ities and one with a local principal place of business may be that the
former defendant has a more substantial connection with another state
than the latter. The absolute amount of each defendant's activity may be
identical, or the former defendant actually may have a larger absolute
quantity of local contact. We should not treat defendants as less amena-
ble to suit merely because they carry on more substantial business in
other states; with one possible qualification, noted immediately below,
the amount of activity elsewhere seems virtually irrelevant to any of the
convenience or fairness policies underlying the imposition of general ju-
risdiction over a defendant. Thus, the due process clause should permit
general jurisdiction on the basis of activities when the defendant reaches
the quantum of local activity in which a purely local company typically
would engage.
A defendant's greater affiliation with a different state is, in one cir-
cumstance, of great significance. This circumstance occurs when the de-
fendant has the right to vote in a different state. Only domicile, not
substantial activity in a state, earns the right to vote. Because political
fairness results from an opportunity to participate in political processes,
domicile indeed provides a stronger basis for general jurisdiction than
carrying on substantial unrelated activities in a state, even when the ab-
solute amount of activity for each is the same. This qualification, how-
ever, is likely to have little practical importance. Natural persons usually
do not perform substantial or continuous unrelated activities in a state
where they are not eligible to vote. And, of course, a corporate defend-
ant cannot exert political influence by the right to vote. Instead, they
may lobby, advertise, make campaign contributions, and exert other
types of political pressure where they have a substantial enough stake in
the political process to justify such activity. This decision to exert polit-
ical influence, however, does; not depend on whether the corporation has
its greatest attachment to that state, but rather on whether the level of
attachment in that state exceeds the threshold beyond which exerting
political influence is profitable.
The nonunique relationship of continuous and systematic activities,
therefore, satisfies the reciprocal benefits and burdens rationale as well as
do unique affiliations, with the sole exception that domicile remains su-
perior to nonunique activities as a jurisdictional basis for natural persons
who have no right to vote in the state in which they carry on these activi-
ties. The basic inquiry mus: be whether the defendant's level of activity
rises to the level of activity of an insider, so that relegating the defendant
to the political processes is fair. Such a quantum of activity is a prerequi-
742
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General Jurisdiction
site to asserting a state's coercive power when the state cannot -justify
such power by its authority to regulate in-state activities. Significantly,
for purposes of general jurisdiction, the relevant issue is the absolute
amount of activity, not the amount of activity relative to what the de-
fendant does outside the state.
3. Interstate and Intrastate Activities.-We have discussed thus far
only the quantity of local contacts necessary to establish general jurisdic-
tion and have left aside issues of quality. Inquiry into the type of activi-
ties might seem unnecessary because the determination of substantive
relevance exhausts qualitative issues. But not all contacts unrelated to a
suit are alike, and the reason for the differences bears on the qualitative
distinction underlying the test for general jurisdiction. Predicating juris-
diction on certain contacts will likely cause disincentives for conduct that
gives rise to such contacts. 101 Indeed, the relatedness test recognizes that
the availability of jurisdiction aids the state in discouraging or regulating
actionable conduct within the state. Discouraging some sorts of conduct
by the imposition of jurisdiction, however, may be constitutionally
problematic.
Again, we can analyze activities as a basis of general jurisdiction by
comparing activities to the paradigm bases, domicile, incorporation, or
principal place of business. One difference between the in-state actions of
locals and the in-state actions of outsiders is that the latter are more
likely than the former to involve interstate transactions. An outsider's
activities in the state may stem entirely from interstate activity, a fact
made relevant by the Constitution.10 2 Because predicating jurisdiction
upon interstate conduct provides disincentives to engage in it, such juris-
diction may be unconstitutional under the commerce clause.'0 3 Disin-
centives to interstate commerce are particularly problematic in general
jurisdiction cases because they affect innocent conduct, not conduct that
gives rise to the litigation and that the state legitimately may seek to
discourage. To illustrate how interstate activity may deny the exercise of
general jurisdiction despite a large quantity of innocent, intrastate activ-
101. Cf Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 227, 234 (1967) (asserting that liberal long-arm statutes can stifle commerce in states quite
distant from the forum).
102. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Constitution does not explicitly limit state interfer-
ence with interstate commerce. Early on, however, the Supreme Court found that the negative im-
plications of the commerce clause limit the scope of state power even in the absence of explicit
congressional regulation under the clause. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1824).
103. See, eg., Davis v. Farmer's Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923) (holding that the
state's imposition of general jurisdiction over every railroad that maintained a soliciting agent in that
state was unconstitutional under the commerce clause). See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note
19, § 4.30 (discussing the commerce clause as a limit on state court jurisdiction).
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ity, we turn to Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. '04
In ruling that Texas could not exercise general jurisdiction, the
Court in Helicopteros gave short shrift to the defendant's contacts with
Texas, which included large-scale purchases of helicopters manufactured
there.105 Relying on Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co. 106 for the prop-
osition that mere purchases in the forum by a defendant do not justify
personal jurisdiction,10 7 the Court dismissed as insignificant the defend-
ant's negotiations in Texas, withdrawal of money from a Texas bank, the
purchase of ninety percent of its helicopter fleet in Texas over a seven-
year period, and sending of numerous pilots and management personnel
to Texas for training.10 8 The Court concluded that these activities were
not "the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts"
required by due process to uphold general jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration.10 9 Although the Helicopteros Court clearly suggested that
some contacts count for general jurisdiction while others do not, the
opinion itself offers no explicit guidance for distinguishing between them.
One approach would be to distinguish between intrastate and inter-
state activities. A defendant's intrastate activity should count more
heavily towards general jurisdiction than its purely interstate activity-
that in-state activity which engages the defendant from across the state's
borders. An example of interstate activity would be the solicitation of
orders from out of state, whereas intrastate activity would include local
manufacturing or management. This distinction helps to explain the dif-
ferent results of Helicopteros and Perkins. In Perkins, the Court permit-
ted Ohio to exercise genera~i jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation
whose forum contacts consisted of directors' meetings, business corre-
spondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, and the general
management of the corporation's wartime activities by its Ohio-based
president.'10 Unlike those in Perkins, the contacts in Helicopteros were
not primarily the result of intrastate transactions. 11 This distinction be-
104. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
105. See id. at 423-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
107. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.
108. See id. at 423-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 416 (emphasis added); see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945) (stating that the "quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws" is an important concern in considering whether the court has general
jurisdiction).
110. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
111. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410. Technically, the contacts in Helicopteros were interna-
tional rather than interstate: the defendant was a Colombian corporation that performed all its
services, helicopter transportation, in South America. See id. at 409-10. This fact should not affect,
however, the analysis under the dormant commerce clause. The clause expressly applies to "Com-
merce with foreign Nations" as well as commerce "among the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. I,
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General Jurisdiction
tween interstate and intrastate contacts also explains the otherwise pecu-
liar suggestion, in other cases, that mere solicitation does not constitute
doing business and cannot in itself establish jurisdiction.' 12
The justification for an interstate-intrastate distinction appears in
dormant commerce clause doctrine.113 Two strands of theory underlie
this doctrine:1 14 one focuses on the protection of free trade between the
states, 115 and the other concentrates on preventing state discrimination
against interstate trade.1 16 Courts reviewing state action under the free
trade strand generally assess the extent of the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce and then balance state and national interests against that
burden. 17 If both the burden and the national interest favoring un-
restricted commerce are large, the state action will be struck down as an
undue burden on interstate commerce, unless a countervailing state inter-
est prevails.' 18
Arguably this free trade strand of the dormant commerce clause
doctrine supports the distinction between interstate and intrastate activ-
ity in general jurisdiction analysis. Imposing general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation engaged only in interstate activity may constitute a
burden on interstate commerce. Such jurisdiction raises the cost of en-
§ 8, cl. 1. Apparently, most dormant commerce clause cases address state restrictions on interstate
commerce. Nonetheless, there is no reason for differentiating between international and interstate
activity in this context. Consequently, we will treat situations involving international contacts as
raising the same dormant commerce clause issues as interstate contacts and will use interstate to
refer to both types of contacts.
112. See, e.g., People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918) (stating
that acts of agents without authority beyond solicitation are not sufficient to constitute doing busi-
ness for purposes of jurisdiction); Barcelona Hotel, Ltd. v. Mahoney Hadlow & Adams, 82 A.D.2d
790, 791, 440 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (1981) (finding that a law firm whose only contact was mail and
telephone transactions did not have a "continuous, systematic and regular" presence).
113. The dormant power to regulate interstate commerce lies exclusively in Congress. See Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1824). The Supreme Court first referred to "the power to
regulate commerce in its dormant state" in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
245, 252 (1829). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing "implied rather than expressed" constitutional limitations on states under the commerce
clause).
114. For a general discussion of the two strands of theory that underlie the dormant commerce
clause, see Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause To Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 439-41 (1982);
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125, 130-31.
115. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 527-29 (1959) (invalidating Illinois
statute because it placed "a great burden of delay and inconvenience" on interstate truck lines by
making equipment illegal that was legal in 45 other states and requiring installation of innovative
equipment).
116. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979) (articulating a three-part test
that includes determining whether the challenged statute "discriminates against interstate commerce
either on its face or in practical effect").
117. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779 (1945) (finding that a "slight and
dubious" safety advantage of a state law limiting the number of railroad cars in a train does not
counterbalance the harm to interstate commerce).
118. See id.
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gaging in interstate business by requiring the corporate defendant to liti-
gate claims unrelated to its forum activities in distant and perhaps
unpredictable forums, where it possibly will be subject to local law. In-
deed, in several older cases, courts invalidated assertions of jurisdiction
on commerce clause grounds. 119
In contrast, if a corporation engages only in a large amount of intra-
state activity, general jurisdiction over it may impose little burden on
interstate commerce. Suit in a "home" forum not only will be predict-
able, but also should not overly tax the resources of the foreign corpora-
tion, which presumably will be familiar with local law and can retain
local counsel more easily. Moreover, allowing jurisdiction will not
threaten the national interest in free trade because any burden derives
from intrastate activities, which are not constitutionally protected. 120
The discrimination strand of the dormant commerce clause doctrine
also offers support for distinguishing interstate and intrastate contacts.
Discriminatory state treatment of interstate commerce is invalid because
"legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some
interests within the state."1 2- This standard will invalidate state action
that has the discriminatory effect of favoring insiders at the expense of
outsiders, even when the burden on free trade is minimal. 122
Of course, imposing general jurisdiction on the basis of continuous
and systematic activities is not discriminatory on its face; both outsiders
119. See, e.g., Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 495 (1929); Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924); Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315
(1923).
120. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 303 (1978) (de-
fining interstate commerce). The Court has drawn on the interstate-intrastate distinction in passing
on the constitutionality of state door-closing statutes, which bar foreign corporations that have not
qualified to conduct intrastate business from litigating in local courts. In Allenberg Cotton Co. v.
Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1974), the Court held that the commerce clause does not allow a state
to deny access to its courts if the plaint:ff is litigating an interstate claim. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-
On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1961), however, the Court permitted such a bar when the
foreign corporation's claim was intrastate in nature. See also Note, A Proposed Minimum Threshold
Analysis for the Imposition of State Door-Closing Statutes, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1360. 1365-73
(1983) (proposing a uniform minimum threshold of contacts to permit an unqualified corporate
plaintiff to sue in a state court on an interstate claim).
121. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938). But
see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648-49 (1987) (finding that the the mere
fact that some of the burden of state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not establish
discrimination).
122. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). The Supreme Court
has given various meanings to the term "discrimination." See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 276 (1 lth ed. 1985). For example, whereas City of Philadelphia concerned a state law that was
discriminatory on its face, presumptively enacted for an illegitimate purpose, 437 U.S. at 627, the
Court in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), invalidated an ordinance that was discrim-
inatory only in its effect, although it noted the law's legitimate purpose, see id. at 354-56.
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and insiders are subject to it. In application, however, the burden of
expansive general jurisdiction falls entirely on the shoulders of the out-
sider. Assume, for example, that state A counts interstate activity in its
minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction. Insider Corporation
is not concerned with A's aggressiveness because it will be subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction in A even under the most conservative jurisdictional
standards. But Outsider Corporation now must answer not only to unre-
lated claims in states where it is a true insider, but also to unrelated
claims in A, where it is an outsider. Assuming that their businesses are
equal in size and distribution throughout the country, Outsider Corpora-
tion is subject to one more forum of general jurisdiction than Insider
Corporation solely because A counts interstate contacts.1 23 Not only is
Outsider Corporation less politically able than insiders to change this
situation, but the local government will have incentive to continue this
practice because it will give insider businesses a competitive edge over
outsiders that exclusively bear the costs of the extra forum of general
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the practice provides a boon to the local bar,
a group that is hardly without influence in local politics.124
Thus, courts should weigh a defendant's intrastate contacts more
heavily and should discount purely interstate activity in determining
whether to exercise general jurisdiction. The Perkins Court upheld gen-
eral jurisdiction over a defendant engaging in extensive intrastate activity
that amounted to the management of the company in the forum.1 25 In
Helicopteros, on the other hand, the Court denied the state's exercise of
general jurisdiction over a defendant whose intrastate activity-negotia-
tions and pilot and management training-was far from substantial and
could not be counted with the defendant's large-scale interstate and in-
ternational activity-purchases of helicopters. 126 At least one court has
refused to exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant whose forum
contacts were wholly interstate. In Lumber Mart, Inc. v. Haas Interna-
tional Sales & Service, Inc., the North Dakota Supreme Court denied the
exercise of jurisdiction because the unrelated forum contacts included
only interstate commerce activity, namely, registering with a regulatory
department and obtaining a trip permit.1 27 But another court has ex-
123. Cf Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256 (1938) (prohibiting the
taxation of interstate commerce when it subjects such commerce to "cumulative burdens not im-
posed on local commerce").
124. Cf Macey & Miller, supra note 56, at 506-09 (describing the power of the Delaware bar as a
political interest group influencing Delaware corporate law).
125. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
126. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
127. 269 N.W.2d 83, 89 (N.D. 1978); see also Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 217 (1st
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tended general jurisdiction over foreign corporations whose forum con-
tacts were interstate in nature. In Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Industries,
Inc., the district court exerted general jurisdiction over defendants whose
only contacts were periodic sales of food products to Illinois companies
over a three-year period. 128 Exercising such jurisdiction ignores the dis-
criminatory and burdensome impact on interstate trade that results when
interstate contacts are the sole basis for general jurisdiction.
C. Transient Jurisdiction
Transient jurisdiction 129 presents an unresolved question of due pro-
cess: Does an individual's mere presence in the state for service of pro-
cess constitute sufficient contact to confer on the state power to
adjudicate? The issue predominantly arises in the context of individual
rather than corporate defendants because a corporation does not have a
tangible existence and thus is unable to move about. Yet the presence of
a corporate employee acting as agent in the forum arguably constitutes
the presence of the corporation. A corporate employee's mere presence
in the forum, however, does not necessarily indicate the representation of
the corporation, and at least; two lower courts have held that transient
presence may be an inappropriate basis for jurisdiction over corporate
defendants. 130
For individuals, however, the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff
enshrined the principle that a state has the power to assert jurisdiction
over individuals solely because they were served while in the state.131
Pennoyer's rationale was simple: a state has complete authority over per-
Cir. 1984) (stating that interstate sales to wholesale distributors and employment of sales representa-
tives to solicit business in forum were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction).
128. See 496 F. Supp. 85, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see also Huffman v. Inland Oil & Transp. Co., 98
Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1017, 424 N.E.2d 1209, 1215 (1981) (finding that a "regular pattern of commerce
and transportation by [the defendant] throughout the waterways of the State" was an adequate
nexus for general jurisdiction).
129. The term "transient jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction over persons temporarily present in
the forum. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 4.10.
130. See, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1985) (remarking
that the case was not one in which the defendant employee had visited the forum in a purely personal
capacity); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(stating that "mere service of process upon a defendant transiently present in the jurisdiction does
not vest a state with personal jurisdiction over the defendant"); see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067, at 251-53 (2d ed. 1987) (stating that courts gradually
have recognized that the casual presence of a corporate agent in a state is insufficient to subject a
corporation to suit there on claims unconnected to the corporation's activities there). But see
Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assoc., 89 F.R.D. 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding
sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction over the defendant's managing partner while in transit at
the airport).
131. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
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General Jurisdiction
sons and things within its borders. 132 The more modem focus on defend-
ants' rights, however, casts doubt upon the propriety of such naked
territorial assertions of jurisdiction. 133 Increasingly, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that assertions of jurisdiction must be fair'34 and that
defendants must be able to predict when their behavior might result in
their being subject to suit in a particular forum.1 35 Indeed, the Pennoyer
notion that state power extends to all defendants physically within the
forum may have perished in Shaffer v. Heitner, in which the Supreme
Court held that all assertions of state jurisdiction must satisfy the stan-
dard of fairness based on minimum contacts set forth in International
Shoe. 136 We begin our analysis by examining the past of transient juris-
diction. Then, we assess its current legal vitality and conclude by evalu-
ating the current justifications for the doctrine.
L The Past of Transient Jurisdiction.-Before the advent of mod-
em transportation, when traveling was difficult and ties between jurisdic-
tions were attenuated, courts justifiably were concerned that defendants
could evade suit by avoiding forums in which potential plaintiffs resided.
Early American jurisdictional theory developed at least in part as a-re-
sponse to this problem. An early Massachusetts opinion concludes:
A debtor coming here merely for the purpose of embarking may be
detained several months before he procures a passage; he may have
all his effects about him; and he may never return to the place
where he transacted his business. If the creditor cannot take him
here, he may lose his chance of securing his debt.137
Theoretical notions of sovereignty exacerbated the practical
problems associated with obtaining jurisdiction against someone outside
a forum. Nations had absolute authority over persons and things within
their borders but none over persons and things outside their territory.138
The American federal system incorporated a theory of state sovereignty
that paralleled Locke's theory of sovereignty of independent nations.
Locke concluded that an individual's very presence "within the territo-
ries of [a] government" obligated that person to obey the government. 139
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (focusing on
whether the corporate defendant has minimum contacts with the forum so that maintenance of the
suit is fair and just).
134. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
135. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
136. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
137. Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354, 358 (1819).
138. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1878).
139. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 119, at 181-82 (T. Cook ed.
1947).
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The Supreme Court in Pennoyer accepted the view that the American
states "exercise the authority of independent States," and concluded that
"every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory."' 14°
The development of transient jurisdiction after Pennoyer revealed
the conflation of notice to the defendant with power to adjudicate. 141
Initially, the rule in Pennoyer sought to protect defendants from suits
brought in states where they were unlikely to hear of their potential lia-
bility.' 42 Concern with due process requirements led the Pennoyer Court
to invalidate Oregon's practice of providing constructive notice to non-
resident defendants who owned property in Oregon. 143 Transient juris-
diction worked a nice balance between notions of state sovereignty and
individual rights, because it ensured that a defendant had received notice
of the suit, and at the same time it allowed the state to exercise its tradi-
tional authority over those present within its borders. Hence, after Pen-
noyer,'4 courts regularly upheld a forum's power over individuals on the
sole basis of the person's presence in the forum when served. 145
2. Transient Jurisdiction's Current Status.-The key to the current
legal status of transient jurisdiction rests with the holdings of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington 146 and Shaffer v. Heitner. 47 In Interna-
140. 95 U.S. at 722.
141. Courts have read Pennoyer as evaluating state power to adjudicate in terms of the reliability
of notice to defendant. See, eg., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940) (expanding the bases of
jurisdiction acceptable under Pennoyer in light of more efficient means of providing constructive
notice).
142. This protection derived from.Pennoyer's requirement of presence within the territorial juris-
diction of the court. See 95 U.S. at 733. The Pennoyer rule also sought to prevent "encroachment
upon the independence of the state" to exercise its sovereignty over the defendant, when the defend-
ant or his property was present within the state's borders. See id. at 723.
143. See id. at 726.
144. Commentators disagree on the extent to which Pennoyer created transient jurisdiction in
America. Compare Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 292 (1956) (finding little support for the doctrine in the
common law before Pennoyer) with Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the
Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 565, 572 (1979) (claiming that state
courts adopted the English concept of presence-oriented jurisdiction early in the nineteenth century).
145. See, eg., Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (st Cir. 1976) (upholding jurisdic-
tion over defendant served while in forum on unrelated business); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp.
442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while flying over forum);
Fitzhugh v. Reid, 252 F. 234, 237 (E.D. Ark. 1918) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served
while in forum for medical treatment); Lee v. Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 528, 36 So. 720, 720 (1903)
(upholding jurisdiction over defendant served while traveling through forum); Fisher, Brown & Co.
v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 104, 34 A. " 14, 715 (1895) (upholding jurisdiction over defendant served
while in forum on business unrelated to cause of action); Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481,484, 119
N.W.2d 737, 739 (1963) (same).
146. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
147. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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General Jurisdiction
tional Shoe, the Supreme Court imposed a minimum contacts test for in
personam jurisdiction. 148 It also suggested, however, that presence re-
mained an alternate basis for jurisdiction:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'14 9
The phrasing suggests that notwithstanding the new minimum contacts
approach, the International Shoe Court approved transient
jurisdiction. 150
Some years later, the Court appeared to reassert both transient juris-
diction and the state's absolute power over persons served within its bor-
ders in New York v. O'Neill.151 Obeying an interstate agreement, Florida
authorities transported O'Neill, a nonresident, to New York to appear as
a witness in a criminal proceeding taking place there. 152 O'Neill objected
and the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the state lacked power to
order a nonresident to perform acts outside Florida. The United States
Supreme Court, without a single citation, reversed: "IT]he Florida
courts had immediate personal jurisdiction over respondent by virtue of
his presence within that State."' 153 O'Neill's presence "gave the Florida
Courts constitutional jurisdiction to order an act even though that act is
to be performed outside of the State."' 154
Shaffer v. Heitner, like International Shoe, emphasized fundamental
fairness as the core of jurisdictional due process. 55 Commentators were
quick to interpret Shaffer's extension of minimum contacts to all bases of
jurisdiction as the death knell of transient jurisdiction. Representative of
the general trend is the view of Professor Werner:
[Transient jurisdiction] can find no support, however, in the post-
Shaffer world ofjurisdiction.... In my opinion, the 'catch as catch
can' theory of in personam jurisdiction, based upon the unrelated
physical presence of a defendant within the forum state, is, and
should be, entombed along with the attachment basis of
148. 326 U.S. at 316.
149. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added).
150. According to one recent decision, this exception in International Shoe "foreclosed judicial
reconsideration" of transient jurisdiction until Shaffer. Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A.,
765 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1985).
151. 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
152. Florida invoked its Uniform Statute To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or
Without the State in Criminal Proceedings to justify transporting O'Neill to New York. O'Neill, a
nonresident of Florida, was there for a convention. See id. at 3.
153. Id. at 8-9.
154. Id. at 9.
155. See 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
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jurisdiction. 156
The proposed revisions to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
likewise cast doubt on the sufficiency of mere presence.15 7
The relevance of Shaffer to transient jurisdiction, however, is not at
all clear, given O'Neill's indication that transient presence remained a
valid basis of jurisdiction after International Shoe. Shaffer arguably only
extended in personam standards to jurisdiction based on property. Jus-
tice Stevens, concurring in Shaffer, suggested that transient presence in a
forum may satisfy International Shoe's minimum contacts standard.
Basing his analysis on notice to the defendant, Stevens's definition of no-
tice included more than mere notification of the filing of a particular suit;
notice meant that an individual could foresee that certain conduct might
subject one to jurisdiction. 5s At least one current Justice, then, seems
willing to accept transient jurisdiction on the grounds that it meets Inter-
national Shoe's notice-based analysis of due process. Various lower
courts have found the notice reasoning persuasive.159
3. Current Justifications for Transient Jurisdiction.-Against this
backdrop of uncertain and contradictory case law, a return to first princi-
ples is in order. Transient jurisdiction is comparable to other forms of
general jurisdiction in several ways. First, the state cannot justify this
assertion of adjudicatory authority in terms of its power to effectuate
local substantive interests. Like most general jurisdiction cases, the
cause of action in a transient jurisdiction case is not related to forum
activities; therefore, the litigation is not a means of regulating local con-
duct. Innocent transit through the state is not an activity to which the
state reasonably can object.
156. Werner, supra note 144, at 589; see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 130,
§ 1064, at 232 n. 15 (suggesting that Shaffer may undercut transient jurisdiction, at least for in rem
and quasi in rem cases); Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In
Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REv. 38, 61 (1979) (asserting that in light of Shaffer "there is
little need for the 'catch-as-catch-can' attitude which justifies the transient rule"). But see Glen, An
Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607,
611 (1979) (contending that transient jurisdiction is appropriate if an individual entered a forum
purposefully).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 16, 17, 28 (Proposed Revisions 1986).
158. Stevens described his idea cf notice as follows:
The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a particular activ-
ity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. If I visit another State
... I knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over ... my person
while there. My contact with tIe State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks.
433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concuning).
159. See, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating
that notice of suit is sufficient for due process); Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(emphasizing that defendant received notice adequate for due process requirements).
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The constitutional protection afforded innocent transit 160 casts fur-
ther doubt on the validity of transient jurisdiction. A state may not dis-
courage nonresidents from exercising their simple right to travel into the
state, 161 particularly when the state can point to no cognizable substan-
tive interest justifying imposition of the burden. In addition, many states
have recognized that under certain circumstances imposition of jurisdic-
tion on nonresidents is burdensome and may deter the conduct upon
which it is predicated. For instance, courts typically grant immunity
from process for nonresident witnesses, so as not to discourage them
from appearing voluntarily to testify.1 62 Admittedly, the state volunta-
rily grants this immunity; the due process clause does not require special
treatment for those appearing as witnesses. 163
Other justifications for transient jurisdiction are equally problem-
atic. The argument that service within the state assures notice of suit
appears to justify transient jurisdiction, but notice alone cannot establish
jurisdiction.164 Furthermore, mere entry into a state should not establish
notice that defendants may be served with process. The forum could as
easily determine that ownership of real property in the state alerts de-
fendants that they may be subject to suit on unrelated claims, yet Shaffer
v. Heitner prohibits such assertions of jurisdiction. 65
Moreover, if notice of the suit is the goal, other means can accom-
plish this end; service of process need not coincide with the defendant's
presence in the state. Suppose, for example, a state adopts a long-arm
160. The right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
161. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (striking down a California law
that made bringing a known nonresident indigent into the state a misdemeanor); Crandall v. Ne-
vada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (invalidating a Nevada tax imposed on persons entering or
leaving the state).
162. See, e.g., Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916) (discussing the immunity of parties
when process is served on them while in attendance at court and in transit thereto); Diamond v.
Earle, 217 Mass. 499, 500-01, 105 N.E. 363, 363 (1914) (describing witnesses' immunity from ser-
vice); Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 327-28, 74 A.2d 142, 143 (1950) (explaining immunity
from service granted to a nonresident defendant present in the state for criminal proceeding). See
generally F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.26-2.31, at 98-101 (1985) (summarizing
rules relating to immunity from service).
163. See, eg., Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 286, 196 A.2d 513, 522 (1963) (stating that a
court may retain jurisdiction over a witness unless such jurisdiction would violate the International
Shoe standards of fairness); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 83 comment b
(1969) (stating that only the needs of judicial administration support granting witnesses and attor-
neys immunity); see also Keeffe & Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 471, 489
(1947) (arguing that sentimentality for the defendant has led to the expansion of circumstances in
which a witness receives immunity from service).
164. Many of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional decisions resulted from cases in which defend-
ants received actual notice and appeared to urge the constitutional defense of due process. See, e.g.,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
165. See 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
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statute predicating jurisdiction upon the defendant's prior presence in the
state at any time and directing notice by registered mail. This statute
probably would violate due process, but its underlying notice rationale
differs little from that for t:iansient jurisdiction.1 66
This hypothetical statute also illustrates why the consent justifica-
tion for transient jurisdiction is unconvincing. If we assume that every
person entering a state effectively agrees to state-imposed conditions,
then the state should be able to extract consent to suit from the defend-
ant's ever having entered the forum. Perhaps entering the state does sig-
nal consent to obey state law while there, and the state has a clear
legitimate interest in the obedience of visitors. 167 But this interest justi-
fies only specific jurisdiction to regulate local activities and not transient
jurisdiction over unrelated claims.
Furthermore, the state's rationale for compelling attendance after a
defendant has received service but left the state is far from clear, because
the power to regulate seems to dissolve upon departure. Consent adds
nothing to the analysis; the state simply cannot presume tacit consent to
state jurisdiction for any unrelated matter. Interests of individual rights
and comity among the states preclude such an unreasonable presump-
tion. A sovereign nation may have the right to forbid entry, and thus it
may condition entry upon assent to jurisdiction. The American states,
however, neither can forbid nor impose unreasonable conditions upon
interstate travel. 168
Notwithstanding these criticisms, lower courts have not been quick
to consign transient jurisdi<tion to the dustbin of history. Some courts
have upheld it in the belief that forum non conveniens or venue transfer
will prevent abuses. 169 But because a court may condition forum non
conveniens dismissals upon waiving certain defenses in the new forum,170
and because venue transfers preserve the plaintiff's choice of law,171
these devices do little to curb abusive forum shopping. Other courts sim-
ply have noted that the Supreme Court has not yet declared transient
166. One could argue that transient presence at least protects the defendant's repose; the person
that leaves the state without being served has completely escaped transient jurisdiction. Our hypo-
thetical long-arm statute would not allow such an escape.
167. Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984) (concluding that publi-
cation's regular circulation in the forum was sufficient to support assertion of jurisdiction in a libel
action based on contents of the publication); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 6.10 (stating that
states have an interest in shaping their tort rules to influence the conduct of those that come within
their borders).
168. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
169. See, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1985);
Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assoc., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
170. See, e.g., Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
171. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 624 (1964).
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General Jurisdiction
jurisdiction invalid under minimum contacts analysis.172 Still others
have required that at least one of the parties have some connection with
the forum. 17 3
Certainly the rule's most favorable aspect is its straightforward ap-
plication, a rare and welcome characteristic in due process litigation.
The rule allows a state court to bypass complicated weighings of unre-
lated contacts under the continuous and systematic test. Furthermore,
extreme abuses, cases in which transient presence is the sole ba~is for
jurisdiction, may be rare because plaintiffs typically locate defendants by
their more substantial forum activities.
We must choose between a clear, simple-though overly broad-
rule, or the more difficult tests for general jurisdiction that are used when
the defendant is served in another state. On balance, transient jurisdic-
tion has outlived its theoretical justifications. Originally, the doctrine
sought to ensure that defendants received notice of pending lawsuits. In
the day of Pennoyer, notice seemed a sufficient protection of defendants'
rights.'7 4 The Supreme Court now recognizes, however, that notice
alone does not confer power to adjudicate. 175 We are uncertain whether
allowing suits against defendants whose only connection to the forum is
transient presence serves any legitimate state interests.
D. Consent to Jurisdiction
Consent traditionally has been a basis for exercising personal juris-
diction because, unlike for subject matter jurisdiction, the parties may
waive personal jurisdiction.176 A party expressly may submit to a court's
jurisdiction by contractual consent in advance of the dispute' 77 or may
submit inadvertently by making a general appearance.1 78 The Supreme
Court recognized consent as a basis for jurisdiction in National Equip-
ment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent. 179 The out-of-state defendants in that
172. See, e.g., Amusement Equip., 779 F.2d at 268 & n.8 (noting that the Supreme Court's ap-
proach has precluded clear-cut jurisdictional rules); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 734, 273
S.E.2d 22, 23-24 (1980) (stating that the Supreme Court has "yet to reach the issue" whether persons
without minimum contacts can be subject to personal jurisdiction solely because they were served
while transient in the state).
173. See Waite v. Waite, 367 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. 1985).
174. See supra section II(C)(1).
175. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
176. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d
697, 699-700 (6th Cir. 1978); see also C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 23, 25
(4th ed. 1983) (contending that parties cannot waive lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but may
waive in personam jurisdiction).
177. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964).
178. See Cuellar v. Cuellar, 406 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, no writ).
179. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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Texas Law Review
case had agreed in a leasing contract to designate a third party as agent
for service of process within the state of New York. Recognizing the
parties' ability to consent to jurisdiction by contract, the Court upheld
the agreement.' 80
The Szukhent defendants consented to specific jurisdiction,' 8 ' but
parties conceivably might provide for jurisdiction that is general in all
respects. In other words, they might agree to jurisdiction for suits that
bear no relationship to the instrument in which they express consent and
that have no relationship to the chosen forum. 182 Parties could draft an
agreement that subjects a defendant to the forum's general jurisdiction,
which would permit any individual, even one not a party to the agree-
ment, to sue on any subject matter, even one with no connection to the
forum. This kind of consent clause would rarely appear in a private con-
tract because one party wotd have little reason to extract such consent
from another. Analogous consent does exist, however, when a foreign
corporation appoints an agent for service of process.' 83
Contractual consent to jurisdiction is subject to standard contract
law doctrine and may be unenforceable when the consent results from
adhesion, overreaching, or unequal bargaining positions.' 84 But these
limits are imposed by state law, not necessarily by the Constitution.'8 5
The constitutional limitations on assertion of judicial jurisdiction based
on general consent are unclear; the due process clause possibly would
intervene if a state dispatched with such limits or interpreted contractual
consent clauses very broadly. For example, in Szukhent, the due process
clause might have come into play if the New York courts had interpreted
180. Id. at 315-16.
181. The agreement apparently encompassed only amenability to suit arising out of the contract,
and not to suit on unrelated claims. Consent to jurisdiction given in a private contract ordinarily
does not constitute consent to a jurisdiction over any cause of action whatsoever. The Court in
Szukhent did not specifically discuss this issue. The contract designated Weinberg as agent "for
service of process," and the Court only discussed jurisdiction over that particular dispute. See id. at
313. Further, because New York was the location of the offices of the plaintiffs, the forum had some
connection with the controversy. Th-_ opinion states that the corporation's principal place of busi-
ness was New York. See id.
182. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972) (upholding contract
clause that required parties to bring suit in English forum even though that forum was unrelated to
towage contract).
183. Currently, all fifty states require the appointment of a local agent as a condition for trans-
acting certain kinds of business in the state. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1018 (West 1986);
MAss. GEN. L. cl. 181, § 4 (1986); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 63.032 (Vernon Supp. 1988). See
generally R. CASAD, supra note 2, .;.02[2][a] (discussing state requirements that corporations con-
sent to jurisdiction in order to operat in the state); Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of
Reason, 47 N.C.L. REy. 1, 20 (1968) (discussing state requirements that corporations appoint local
agents for service of process).
184. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 162, § 2.23, at 93.
185. But see Szukhent, 375 U.S. tt 324-25 (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that some constitu-
tional protection against adhesion contracts may exist).
756
Vol. 66:721, 1988
HeinOnline -- 66 Tex. L. Rev.  756 1987-1988
l. : ,














i i t a a mt for service of process. 183
l t ti t r t
le t
i , l 184
ril 18s





. . t .
. t tl l ilit t it i i t t t t,
l t t i i ti l
t tit t t t j i3 icti ti t . t i
t t r
i ss," t t l i j i i ti t t ti l i t . i . t
. t , t l ti t i t l i ti , t
ti it t tr r . ~ i i t t t t t r r ti ' ri i l l i
.
. . . ., . ta ., . . I, ) l i t t
.
. tl , ll i t t t i t i t t l l t iti t
ti t i i i l~ . . .g., . lv. .
SS. . . h. , ); . lc. . . . .
ll , ra 11 ~ 0 ][a] ti s
t t j ri i ti i r r t r ~ i t t t ); l r, r ign r oration s: ss f
, . . . . , ) i i t t i ts t t ti i t l l
. . J . ~, s ra t , . , t .
. t s z t, . . at - ( l , J., iss ti ) (s sti t t s stit -
ti l t ti i t i t t i t .
General Jurisdiction
the contract to mean that the designation of an agent for service of pro-
cess made the Szukhent's amenable to suit in New York on any cause of
action, whether or not it related to the contract or to New York. States,
however, have not pressed the constitutional limits of contractual clauses
through expansive readings of private contracts.
The most formidable constitutional issue surrounding general juris-
diction by consent arises when consent derives from a statutorily re-
quired appointment 18 6 rather than from contract. If states with such
statutes allow general jurisdiction when the defendant's forum contacts
arguably neither relate to the controversy nor are "continuous and sys-
tematic," 18 7 they render the due process credentials of statutory appoint-
ment doubtful. To avoid this issue, some courts explicitly require a
minimum contacts analysis in addition to a showing that the defendant's
statutory agent received service of process. In Springle v. Cottrell Engi-
neering Corp.,1838 a Maryland appellate court held that service on a for-
eign corporation's agent subjects the corporation to state jurisdiction if
"the corporation has sufficient contact with the State to make it constitu-
tionally subject to suit here."'189 Under this view, the mere appointment
of a resident agent does not reduce the amount of actual forum contacts
required for jurisdiction. 90
Other courts, however, have almost eliminated minimum contacts
analysis for defendants that have appointed agents. The court in Cowan
v. Ford Motor Co. 191 summarily concluded that "[b]y appointing a resi-
dent agent and conducting substantial business in Mississippi, [the de-
fendant] has consented to Mississippi's exercise of personal
jurisdiction."' 192 The opinion fails to reveal what those substantial con-
186. Of course, the agent frequently provides an additional basis for asserting jurisdiction that
already exists for other reasons. For example, when the cause of action arises in the forum, the state
probably has jurisdiction anyway, so the agent becomes simply the method for serving process.
Likewise, contacts may be sufficiently continuous and systematic that general jurisdiction would
exist independent of the in-state agent. In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446
(1952), the court held that Ohio could assert general jurisdiction over the defendant even though it
had not appointed a statutory agent for service of process.
187. In some states, statutory consent only applies to suits arising from the defendant's forum
activity. See Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 361 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 831 (1966); Williams v. Williams, 621 S.W.2d 567, 569-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
188. 40 Md. App. 267, 391 A.2d 456 (1978).
189. Id. at 288, 391 A.2d at 469; see also Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 110 Idaho 369, 373,
716 P.2d 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that although valid service on resident agent establishes
jurisdiction over nonresident corporation, it is proper to determine the reasonableness of the exercise
of jurisdiction by considering the corporation's contacts with the state).
190. See R. CASAD, supra note 2, 3.02[2][a][ii], at 3-67 to -69 (questioning the reasoning of
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979)).
191. 694 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1982), question certified on reh'g, 713 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), district
court rev'd & action remanded, 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983).
192. Id. at 107; see also Recent Decisions, supra note 1 (discussing the Cowan case).
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Texas Law Review
tacts were, preferring simply to state in a footnote that "sufficient con-
tacts indisputably are present."' 193
Even conclusory assertions of connections to the forum are lacking
from some opinions that have based general jurisdiction wholly on the
defendant's statutory appointment of an agent. In a brief opinion, the
court in Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co. held that Texas courts could
entertain a suit against a foreign corporation for property damages suf-
fered in a truck crash in Louisiana.194 Noting service on the defendant's
resident agent, the court explained that "[t]he rationale behind the the-
ory of consent is that in return for the privilege of doing business in the
state, and enjoying the same rights and privileges as a domestic corpora-
tion, the foreign corporation has consented to amenability to jurisdiction
for purposes of all lawsuits within the state."' 95 The court in Junction
Bit & Tool Co. v. Institution Mortgage Co. 196 went so far as to say that
"minimum contacts would seem patently established" when a "foreign
corporation has actually qualified under Florida law to transact business
in th[e] state and has appointed a resident agent for service of process" as
the Florida statute required. x97
These holdings are consistent with some early Supreme Court prece-
dent. In the first part of this century the Court held that the designation
of an agent could constitutionally confer unlimited general jurisdic-
tion.' 98 In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., Justice Holmes wrote that Missouri could constitutionally exercise
general jurisdiction even though the defendant's only apparent contact
with the forum was its designation of the Missouri Commissioner of In-
surance as its local agent. 199
But none of these cases or their underlying theories seems viable
under today's due process standards.2°° Although the rigid territoriality
193. 694 F.2d at 107 n.8.
194. 520 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ).
195. Id. at 598 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
196. 240 So. 2d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
197. Id. at 882 (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 769, 770-71
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (holding that statutory consent is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, even without
contact between the defendant and the forum).
198. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917)
(Holmes, J.); see also Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (L. Hand, J.) (holding that when a corporation designates an agent in a state, it is as if the
corporation consented to jurisdiction in that state's courts); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal
& Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432,438, 11 N.E. 1075, 1077 (1916) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that the presence of
a designated agent within the state brings the corporation within the jurisdiction of the state courts).
For a discussion of these cases and onsent theory, see Kurland, supra note 11, at 578-82; Walker,
Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 47 N.C.L. REV. 733, 734-36 (1969).
199. 243 U.S. at 95.
200. Professor Walker adopts this view and argues that
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of Pennoyer v. Neff once required in-state service of process to support in
personam jurisdiction,20' the minimum contacts approach of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington 202 led to long-arm jurisdiction. Further-
more, the old notion that a state could entirely exclude corporations or
condition their entry upon consent to jurisdiction because corporations
were state-created legal entities that could not operate beyond a sover-
eign's borders20 3 eroded long ago.2°4
The New Jersey statute at issue in G.D. Searle & Co. v. CQhn 20 5
illustrates the difficulties inherent in continuing to recognize general ju-
risdiction based solely upon consent. Foreign corporations that operate
in New Jersey without having appointed an agent for service of process
face an automatic tolling against them of the state's statute of limitations
during the time that the agent is not residing within the state.20 6 Searle
argued that the statute violated due process by requiring the company to
assent to general jurisdiction in order to receive the benefits of the statute
of limitations. 20 7 The Court declined to address this issue,20 8 but it up-
held the statute against Searle's argument that this rule violated the equal
protection clause. Searle had argued that the state rationally could not
the original reason for foreign corporation laws is lost, and their conceptual foundation is
today largely discredited. State qualification statutes were adopted to solve problems cre-
ated by a nineteenth century constitutional requirement that original legal process be
served within the boundaries of forum states. The operating principle of the laws was also
the product of an unusual nineteenth century development-the proposition that states can
admit out-of-state corporations upon condition because, it was said, they could exclude
them entirely. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have eliminated the service of process
requirement and modern judicial thinking has cut deeply into the acceptability of the prin-
ciple of conditional entry.
Walker, supra note 198, at 733; see also Walker, supra note 183, at 24-30 (contending that the origi-
nal purposes underlying the requirement of service within forums are no longer tenable).
201. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). This requirement of in-state service of process necessitated fictions
whereby out-of-state residents "consented" to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
355 (1927) (sustaining jurisdiction over nonresident motorist under a Massachusetts statute that
made using state highways equivalent to appointing the State Registrar as agent for service of
process).
202. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
203. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839).
204. See, eg., Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1877) (stating that
a state may not prevent a foreign corporation from carrying on interstate commerce within its
borders).
205. 455 U.S. 404 (1981).
206. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-22 (West 1987).
207. 455 U.S. at 412 n.7. In making the argument,
[Searle] notes that it can obtain the benefit of the statute of limitations by appointing an
agent to accept service. Fearing that appointment of an agent might subject it to suit in
New Jersey when there otherwise would not be the minimum contacts required for suit in
that State under the Due Process Clause, petitioner insists that New Jersey law violates due
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toll the statute simply because a corporation had not named an agent for
receipt of service.20 9 Statutes such as that in G.D. Searle, which in effect
require consent to jurisdiction, circumvent all due process notions of fair-
ness underlying minimum contacts analysis and expose the fiction of con-
sent as a basis for jurisdiction. Other lower courts have heeded similar
due process constitutional axguments. 210
E. Property
1. Jurisdiction Based on Property Unrelated to Suit.-For about a
century, jurisdiction in American courts was governed by Pennoyer v.
Neff,211 which established that the due process clause limited a state's
judicial jurisdiction to persons or property present in its territory. In
personam jurisdiction rested on state power over a defendant's person,
and in rem jurisdiction resulted from state authority over property lo-
cated within its borders.
Under in rem jurisdiction, the property itself is the subject of the
cause of action2 12 and judgment affects the interests of all persons in the
property.213 Quasi in rem jurisdiction arose in part from the difficulty of
satisfying judgments against nonresident defendants. 214 Before long-arm
statutes and before widespread recognition of sister states' judgments
under the full faith and credit clause, 21 5 plaintiffs had little assurance of
getting a nonresident defendant into the forum court or of enforcing a
judgment against an absent defendant. To redress this situation, states
allowed plaintiffs to request that the court sequester or garnish defend-
ants' property in the state. Judicial attachment of property either would
209. Id. at 408.
210. For example, the district court in In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation ruled that a
defendant's designation of an agent could not alone make it amenable to suit for an unrelated claim
in West Virginia, when the defendant had maintained no contact with the state for years. 525 F.
Supp. 1265, 1287-88 (D. Md. 1981). The Court explained:
Consent by itself is meaningless-it is significant only as a manifestation of the corpora-
tion's recognition that it has availed itself of "the benefits and protections of the laws" of
the forum by virtue of conducting business activities there. If the corporation conducts no
business in the forum, it has not availed itself of "benefits and protections of the laws" of
the forum and there is no bargain between the corporation and the forum state and there is
no meaning to the corporation's consent to jurisdiction. In such a situation, it would not
be "reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice" to subject the corporation to jurisdiction in that forum. In short, a consent statute
such as [West Virginia's] necessarily incorporates the Due Process "minimum contacts"
requirement.
Id. at 1278 (citations omitted).
211. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
212. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 71, at 21.
213. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
214. See Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187 (1886).
215. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
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General Jurisdiction
force appearance by the defendant or would satisfy default judgment. 216
The idea that an action in rem or quasi in rem proceeded only against
property and affected the property owner only indirectly was therefore a
convenient fiction which enabled plaintiffs to bypass the in personam ju-
risdiction requirement that the defendant be within the forum. 217
No significant constitutional problems, beyond determining related-
ness, arise when a court bases jurisdiction on property of the defendant
that relates to the cause of action. The Supreme Court has recognized:
When claims to the property itself are the source of the under-
lying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would
be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have
jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's claim to property lo-
cated in the State would normally indicate that he expected to ben-
efit from the State's protection of his interest.218
For example, actions to quiet title or to resolve a contract dispute after
the forum court attaches the disputed goods are clearly within the juris-
diction of the state where the property is located.219 We will not focus on
such relatively uncomplicated and straightforward applications of quasi
in rem and in rem jurisdiction. Instead, we will examine jurisdiction
based on property unrelated to the dispute and focus on the relevance of
unrelated property to in personam jurisdiction.
By extending the minimum contacts requirement to property-based
jurisdiction, Shaffer v. Heitner220 corrected the anomalous treatment of a
defendant's unrelated property under quasi in rem jurisdiction. In Shaf-
fer, the defendants' only purported contact with the forum was their
shares of stock, stock options, and other rights statutorily deemed pres-
ent within the state.221 The-lower court sequestered this property to ob-
tain jurisdiction over the defendants in plaintiff's stockholder derivative
suit.222 The Supreme Court found the contacts between the forum and
the defendants insufficient to justify jurisdiction;223 sequestration alone
could not correct such a defect because
the only role played by the property is to provide the basis for
216. For an example of the operation of these procedures, see Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222
(1905).
217. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720-22 (1878).
218. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977).
219. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Monroe Lange Hardware Imports Corp., 48 N.C. App. 90, 93-94,
268 S.E.2d 868, 870-71 (1980) (finding minimum contacts for quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching
defendant's lumber, which was the subject of the contract dispute and which the defendant had
instructed the plaintiff to ship to the forum state).
220. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
221. Id. at 214.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 216-17.
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bringing the defendant into court. Indeed, the express purpose of
the Delaware sequestration procedure is to compel the defendant
to enter a personal appearance. In such cases, if a direct assertion
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Con-
stitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdic-
tion should be equally impermissible.224
Three years later, Rush v. Savchuk 225 elaborated on Shaffer's hold-
ing by declaring unconstitutional the practice of judicial attachment of
an insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify a defend-
ant226 as a means of obtaining jurisdiction over that defendant. In Rush,
a Minnesota court had attempted to assert jurisdiction over an Indiana
resident whose sole contact with the forum was that his insurer was li-
censed to do business in Minnesota. The Supreme Court held that the
insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify the defendant in
a tort suit arising from an automobile accident in Indiana did not satisfy
the minimum contacts test.227
Shaffer and Rush do not fully resolve property's status as a contact
for the purposes of quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction. Although
the Shaffer opinion clearly states that unrelated property is not always a
sufficient contact by itself for quasi in rem jurisdiction,228 it does not
determine whether a defendant's ownership of unrelated property in the
forum might sometimes constitute a countable contact, or even a suffi-
cient contact by itself, for general in personam jurisdiction.
2. Unrelated Property as a Contact.--Some courts have read Shaft
fer to exclude entirely the use of unrelated property both as a countable
contact for in personam jurisdiction and as the sole means of obtaining
jurisdiction over a defendant. No longer a special jurisdictional contact
uniquely exempted from applications of the minimum contacts test,
property is instead an outcast from the ranks of countable contacts. If
these courts are correct, Shaffer has not rescued property from its unique
role in jurisdictional theory, but merely has changed the explanation for
this uniqueness. Such an Eaterpretation is unreasonably constricting and
ignores a defendant's relevant ties to a potential forum. Gutierrez v. Ray-
mond International, Inc.229 demonstrates the unreasonableness of this
view of Shaffer. A federal district court in Texas had to decide whether
224. Id. at 209.
225. 444 U.S. 319 (1980).
226. This practice has been dubbed Seider-type jurisdiction, after the first case to employ it. See
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1966).
227. See Rush, 444 U.S. at 329-30.
228. See 433 U.S. at 207.
229. 484 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Te:. 1979).
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General Jurisdiction
the defendant's extensive ownership of land in Texas was an act that
constituted doing business under the state long-arm statute.230 Even
though Texas law interprets its statute "as broadly as the federal consti-
tutional requirements of due process will permit,"12 3 1 the court held that
"under the single standard for determining judicial jurisdiction, it would
be improper to allow those contacts to support an action brought in per-
sonam. ' 232 But property ownership was not this defendant's only con-
tact with the forum. The defendant corporation also owned several
Texas subsidiaries and transferred funds used by a nonresident subsidiary
through the Houston offices of another resident subsidiary. 233
The court in Nelepovitz v. Boatwright 234 decided just months after
Shaffer that neither the defendant husband's interest in a South Carolina
limited partnership 235 nor the defendant wife's ownership of mortgaged
real estate in the state provided sufficient contacts between the defend-
ants and the South Carolina forum. 236 Admittedly, such property inter-
ests might not be very significant; however, the court rejected them not
because they were insignificant but simply because they were property
interests.237
These courts are wrong. For one thing, they treat property owner-
ship as though it exists in a vacuum and creates no other possible rights,
expectations, or obligations between the defendant and the forum. More-
over, even if the Supreme Court in Shaffer had unwittingly suggested
relegating unrelated property to the uncountable, lower courts should
recognize that the suggestive language is only dictum and should not be
followed.
We begin our analysis with the facts and wording of Shaffer and
Rush, which leave open the possibility of counting unrelated property as
a contact. The Shaffer Court did not declare that property's presence in
a forum was irrelevant, 238 but clearly authorized reliance on related
property.239 Furthermore, the Court did not say that the presence of
230. Id. at 247-48.
231. Id. at 247 (citing U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex, 1977)).
232. Id. at 248.
233. Id. at 253.
234. 442 F. Supp. 1336 (D.S.C. 1977). The underlying cause of action was a claim for injuries
and loss of consortium due to the alleged negligence of the defendants in allowing their dog to trip
one of the plaintiffs, causing her to fall down a flight of stairs in the defendants' Missouri home. See
id. at 1338.
235. "A partnership interest is personal property." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-42-1210 (Law. Co-op.
1987).
236. See 442 F. Supp at 1338.
237. See id. at 1340.
238. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 97.
239. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977).
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unrelated property could never support jurisdiction; rather, the Court
said that the presence of unrelated property alone could not always jus-
tify jurisdiction.24° The Shqffer Court acknowledged that "the presence
of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by provid-
ing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation."'24'
Although Shaffer gives as examples suits arising from property owner-
ship and torts arising from an absentee owner's negligent care of his
property, these do not compose an exhaustive list of possible jurisdic-
tional bases. The Court does not exclude the possibility of unrelated
property providing contacts.
In Rush v. Savchuk, the Court stated outright that "ownership of
property in the State is a contact between the defendant and the forum,
and it may suggest the presence of other ties. '2 42 Rush thus does not
preclude the possibility that courts could include the contact of property
ownership with others to est~ablish jurisdiction under International Shoe's
standard.
Consequently, not all judges narrowly construe Shaffer. Courts fre-
quently have included as a component of the doing business test a non-
resident's ownership of property2 43 in the forum. Property ownership
may affect the test directly, as a counted activity, or indirectly, 244 as an
outgrowth of other activities that constitute doing business. Courts also
have viewed a defendant's unrelated property as a countable contact for
240. Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 97.
241. 433 U.S. at 207.
242. 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980).
243. Property's role is sometimes unclear because the importance of a corporate defendant's
ownership of unrelated property in a forum state often will be overshadowed by activities that would
be sufficient in themselves, such as incorporation in the forum or maintaining a principal place of
business there.
244. See, e.g., Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (D.S.C. 1979) (listing
among contacts of nonresident corporation in-state ownership of two filing cabinets), rev'd on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980); Horton v. Richards, 594 P.2d 891, 893 (Utah 1979) (listing
among contacts in-state ownership of a bank account and office records); Schroeder v. Raich, 89
Wis. 2d 588, 596, 278 N.W.2d 871, 375 (1979) (inferring substantial contacts from the defendant's
membership in one in-state partnership and ownership of three parcels of land).
The Schroeder court, relying on Wisconsin's statute that requires "substantial and not isolated
activities within [the] state," Wis. S-rAT. ANN. § 801.05(1)(d) (1977), found:
The trier of fact can infer from Raich's membership in at least one partnership and his
ownership of three parcels of real estate, including two stores, that at a minimum, Raich
was involved in the payment of property taxes and income taxes in Wisconsin, in obtaining
insurance coverage on Wisconsin property, and in the rental, maintenance, or other man-
agement operations of the prop.orties .... [With three properties in Wisconsin, I don't
think there is any question about it that he is here for not just isolated activities. He has
substantial activities."
89 Wis. 2d at 596, 278 N.W.2d at 875.
One of the three parcels of property was related to the cause of action, in that the promissory
note was given in partial payment for it. The court, however, does not appear to distinguish this
contact from the unrelated property contacts.
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General Jurisdiction
in personam jurisdiction outside of the doing business context. 245 More-
over, although few cases list property ownership as one of a defendant's
countable contacts with a forum, some courts have implied that the ab-
sence of property owned by the defendant was relevant to a finding of no
jurisdiction.246 Perhaps most noteworthy is the Supreme Court's con-
tact-counting in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall; the
Court listed the defendant's lack of property ownership alongside such
weighty, single-factor contacts as domicile, doing business, and consent
to service, which also were missing in that case.
247
245. In Beechem v. C.M. Pippin, 686 S.W.2d 356, 363 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ), a
Texas Court of Appeals found sufficient contacts between the forum and a nonresident defendant
corporation and its representative to justify jurisdiction. The court went on to note, however, that
"another particularly significant reason why it seems 'fair' or 'substantially just' to assert jurisdic-
tion" over the nonresident representative was his admission to "owning both real and personal prop-
erty in Texas and to having previously conducted sales in Texas." Id. The court explained:
While the possession of property in the forum state does not alone necessarily constitute
sufficient contact to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, Shaffer v. Heitner, it
undoubtedly is important, along with the other activities, to a determination of whether the
defendant has so enjoyed the benefits, protections and privileges of the forum state as to
render the exercise of jurisdiction over his person consistent with "fundamental fairness,"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, even, we think, when those contacts are unrelated to
the controversy.
Id. at 363 (citations omitted).
Yet another case involving jurisdiction based in part on unrelated property is Hann v. Hann,
175 N.J. Super. 608, 421 A.2d 607 (Ch. Div. 1980), in which a woman sued her husband for separate
maintenance. The New Jersey Chancery Court based in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident
husband on several contacts, including the husband and wife's joint ownership of rental property in
New Jersey. The court was careful to distinguish property not related to the cause of action from
marital property that would be related to the cause of action and therefore might confer specific
jurisdiction. Because the plaintiff sought an equitable remedy-she asked the court to restrain her
husband from harassing her-rather than a divorce action dividing their assets, the property was
unrelated to the cause of action. Well aware ofShaffer v. Heitner, the court nevertheless counted the
property contact. Id. at 612, 421 A.2d at 609.
In Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978), the court
counted a form of personal property, the wholly-owned subsidiary. Distinguishing the corporate law
issues from the jurisdictional issue of a relationship between a corporation and its subsidiary, the
court declared:
Quite clearly, the ownership of an affiliated corporation within the forum is a "contact, tie
or relation" of that non-resident with the forum .... Like the ownership of property in the
state, the existence in a forum of an affiliated corporation with which the non-resident has
some relationship implicates a flow of control and benefits to and from the forum as a
consequence of that ownership. It is thus one indication of the non-resident's nexus with
the forum and therefore has some weight in the overall evaluation of the fairness or reason-
ableness of the exercise of jurisdiction.
Id. at 507.
Thus, the court apparently believed that a wholly-owned subsidiary was one kind of property
that entailed sufficient ties between a defendant and a forum, regardless of the relatedness of the
subsidiary to the cause of action.
246. See, e.g., Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 979, 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("[Defendant] has no offices or employees in New York, owns no property in New York, pays no
taxes in New York, and does no banking in New York.").
247. 466 U.S. 408, 411 (1985).
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3. Property Contacts and Fairness.-Counting property contacts
and even treating certain types of pioperty, under certain circumstances,
as the decisive or sole countable contact between a defendant and a fo-
rum is undoubtedly reasonable. Ironically, refusing to count unrelated
property as a contact perpetuates the unjustified treatment property has
long received.248 As an uncountable contact, property ownership occu-
pies a role that is less significant than other dubiously important relation-
ships a defendant may have with a forum, such as maintaining a
telephone directory listing or visiting the state for wholly unrelated rea-
sons. Singling out quasi in rem jurisdiction for discredit creates distinc-
tions between it and other single-factor bases that are difficult to justify.
Why should unrelated visits to the state or unrelated business transac-
tions have so much more jurisdictional significance than a defendant's
property ownership? Why should transient presence in the forum, an
artifact of the Pennoyer v. Neff power theory of general jurisdiction249
and usually unrelated to the cause of action, continue to be jurisdiction-
ally significant if courts have rejected unrelated property ownership? 250
Using property as a jurisdictional contact is reasonable because such
an approach can provide a fair place to defend a suit. Fairness, not sim-
ply foreseeability of suit or state interest, is the most important consider-
ation for general jurisdiction.251 For example, we previously argued that
jurisdiction based on unrelated activities would be fair if they indicate
that the defendant is suffictently involved in the activities of the state to
be an insider whom the state may safely relegate to its political
processes.252 Some forms of property ownership could entail similarly
close ties and thus justify the exercise of general jurisdiction.
4. Assessing the Sufficiency of Unrelated Property Contacts.-As-
suming that unrelated property should count as a jurisdictionally signifi-
cant contact, how should we evaluate the due process sufficiency of a
particular property contact? Evaluating minimum contacts is never an
easy task, and no one test can be applied inflexibly. Particularly with
regard to property contacts, however, no adequate test presently exists.
248. Before Shaffer v. Heitner, property was automatically sufficient to support jurisdiction
under the rule in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905), under which an attachment of defendant's
property within the forum granted the forum court jurisdiction to render a judgment up to the value
of the property.
249. See supra -notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
250. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 10, at 81.
251. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (making "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" the cornerstones of the constitutional test for
jurisdiction); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 4.8, at 117-18 (stating that International Shoe created
"a jurisdictional standard of fairness to the defendant").
252. See supra section II(B)(2).
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General Jurisdiction
(a) The "continuous and systematic" test.-Courts currently
measure the sufficiency of unrelated business contacts between the forum
state and the defendant with the continuous and systematic test: the de-
fendant's activities in the forum state must be continuous and systematic
to support jurisdiction.2 53 Applying this test to a property contact, how-
ever, distorts the meaning of the words and produces an unsatisfactory
result. The continuousness of a property contact obtains meaning only
by joint reference to the property's presence in the forum and the dura-
tion of the defendant's ownership of it. Even a trivial item of property
could satisfy a continuousness test based solely on the length of the prop-
erty's presence in the state. Admittedly, an individual or corporate de-
fendant might engage in continuous and systematic activities in the
forum as part of overseeing or managing its property; however, such ac-
tivities are themselves likely to be countable contacts independent of the
property. Thus, continuousness is not helpful as an attribute of mere
ownership. The continuousness test might help to distinguish tangible
from intangible property according to whether the property had a contin-
uous existence.25 4 The relevant jurisdictional question, however, depends
on the continuousness of the contact with the forum, not the continuous-
ness of the property's existence in general.
A continuousness test cannot encompass the full range of property
attributes that merit jurisdictional attention. What is needed is a new set
of criteria for assessing property contacts, accompanied by a greater will-
253. The Supreme Court first articulated this test in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, further
explained it in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1952), and has consist-
ently applied it since then, see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416
(1985). Courts sometimes rephrase the test. See, eg., Gehling v. St. George's School of Medicine,
Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 541 (3d Cir. 1985) (articulating a test of "continuous and substantial forum
affiliations"); Reed v. American Airlines, Inc., 197 Mont. 34, 39, 640 P.2d 912, 915 (1982) (applying
a test of "substantial, continuous, and systematic" activities).
The International Shoe opinion itself does not appear to distinguish between systematic and
substantial activities. Compare 326 U.S. at 320 (characterizing the defendant's forum activities as
continuous and systematic) with id. at 318 (explaining that sometimes "continuous corporate opera-
tions within a state were thought so substantial" that they justified general jurisdiction).
254. Real property generally will satisfy a minimum contacts continuous and systematic test.
Barring a shift in state boundaries, the presence of real estate in a forum is permanent and therefore
continuous. It cannot be moved or, except in extreme circumstances, destroyed. Tangible personal
property, on the other hand, can be moved out of the forum. Possibly, the length of time that mova-
ble property was in the forum could be relevant to the contact's continuousness; even then, other
factors such as how the property entered the forum would affect any determination of continuous-
ness. Intangible property such as paper securities, debts, certificates of stock, bonds, promissory
notes, and franchises can have several fictional situses, which render it worthless as a jurisdictional
contact. In addition, the parties may dispute the duration of intangible property's existence. For
example, renegotiation of a debt often presents the question whether a promissory note has been
renewed or replaced with a new note. For a discussion of some of the problems regarding situs for
intangible property, see Note, Jurisdictional Limits on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain: Fo-
cus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 394-95 (1985).
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Texas Law Review
ingness to consider property ownership as evidence that a corporate de-
fendant is doing business in a forum. A new test for property's
sufficiency as a contact cannot be "simply mechanical or quantitative"; it
should depend on the quality and nature of the property.255 Such a re-
quirement would consider the property's physical attributes: situs (real
or fictional), mobility, tangibility, and substantiality (i.e., quantity or
value).
(b) Tangibility and mobility. -The jurisdictional significance of
an item of property is linked closely to the determinability of its situs,
which varies with both its tangibility and mobility. Justice Powell al-
ludes to the importance of situs in his Shaffer concurrence. While agree-
ing that the statutorily deemed presence of appellants' stock in Delaware
could not sustain jurisdiction, Justice Powell "would explicitly reserve
judgment... on whether the ownership of some forms of property whose
situs is indisputably and permanently located within a State may, with-
out more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to juris-
diction within the State ....
A definite and ascertainable situs supports the inference that a de-
fendant's property link with a forum is conscious and involves more than
mere ownership, while the fictional presence of intangible property pro-
vides weak evidence of a defendant's connection with the forum. Thus,
the property that presumably justified quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaf-
fer, shares of stock whose presence in the state was but a fiction, con-
ferred no jurisdiction over the nonresident stock owners; these owners
"simply had nothing to do with the state of Delaware."' 257 A person who
buys stock in a Delaware corporation might even be unaware of the ficti-
tious link between the property and the forum. In contrast, owners of
tangible property are aware of where they are using the property as soon
as they use it.
In Rush v. Savchuk, the Supreme Court highlights the distinction
between tangible and intangible property:
[T]he fictitious presence of the insurer's obligation in Minnesota
does not, without more, provide a basis for concluding that there is
any contact in the International Shoe sense between Minnesota and
the insured. To say that "a debt follows the debtor" is simply to
say that intangible property has no actual situs, and a debt may be
sued on wherever there is jurisdiction over the debtor. State Farm
is "found," in the sense of doing business, in all 50 States and the
255. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
256. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 216.
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General Jurisdiction
District of Columbia. Under appellee's theory, the "debt" owed to
Rush would be "present" in each of those jurisdictions simultane-
ously. It is apparent that such a "contact" can have no jurisdic-
tional significance.258
Not all kinds of intangible property are equally prone to this objec-
tion. The situs of some kinds of intangible property is more determinable
than others. For example, the situs of a defendant's business reputation
is likely to follow the defendant's location. Many locatable property
rights have little significance for minimum contacts analysis, however,
because they are likely to be incidental to some other general jurisdic-
tional basis, such as the defendant's principal place of business or
domicile.
In contrast, tangible property, real or personal, has an objective si-
tus. This fact has two relevant consequences. First, because only one
situs exists, only one forum can base jurisdiction on the property. Sec-
ond, the property's one location enables a defendant to foresee the possi-
bility of suit in that forum.
The ability to localize a situs also depends on mobility. Real prop-
erty is a fixed, easily established tie between a defendant and the forum.
But the jurisdictional link between a defendant's movable tangible prop-
erty and the forum is contingent upon several factors.
Counting movable property as a contact would require courts to
designate a time when the property's presence in the forum acquires ju-
risdictional significance. The relevant issue for property related to the
controversy should be the location of the property when the events giving
rise to the cause of action took place. For unrelated property, the issue
may differ. Courts might count certain unrelated contacts at the time the
litigation is before the court instead of the time the cause of action arose.
For example, the court could look to a defendant's current domicile in-
stead of a prior domicile. Transient presence similarly is a jurisdictional
contact obtained at a point in time after the cause of action arises. If the
contact itself admittedly is unrelated to the cause of action, its presence
in the forum need not necessarily coincide with the time that the cause of
action arose.
Nevertheless, at a minimum courts should limit the time at which
they count movable property as a jurisdictional contact to either the time
when the events giving rise to suit occurred or the time when the court
must decide whether to exercise jurisdiction. Courts should not count
property removed from the forum before the cause of action arose be-
258. 444 U.S. 320, 329-30 (1980).
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cause its removal by the owner implies a conscious decision to sever that
tie with the forum.
In addition, fairness would dictate that movable property purpose-
fully placed in the forum should have more jurisdictional significance
than property present in the forum without its owner's knowledge. As
the Supreme Court noted in Helicopteros, "[U]nilateral activity of an-
other party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration. when
determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum
State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction. 259 Applied to movable prop-
erty, this language indicates that either the defendant or his agent must
have taken or sent the movable property into the forum. Limiting juris-
diction to situations in which the defendant is responsible for the prop-
erty's presence in the forum also would be consistent with Shaffer. In
overruling Harris v. Balk,260 the Shaffer Court indicated that a third
party's fortuitous act of bringing a defendant's property into the forum
without the defendant's knowledge or consent would no longer confer
jurisdiction.261
(c) Quantity and substantiality.-The substantiality of a de-
fendant's property contacts also has jurisdictional significance.
Although overshadowed by the continuous and systematic activity re-
quirement, substantiality nevertheless was a due process requirement in
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.262
A substantiality criterion has commonsensical appeal: a defendant
who has entrusted huge sums of capital to a forum's banks or purchased
a ranch the size of Rhode '[sland within Texas would seem to have a
more significant contact with the state than someone who bought one
week per year of a time-share resort condominium or left a few filing
cabinets in the offices of a successor company. Of course, we should
avoid mechanical guidelines for jurisdictional sufficiency based solely on
monetary value or acreage, but most forms of property are more easily
quantified, in units of size or worth in dollars, than other sorts of con-
tacts. These quantifications could reveal at least partially the signifi-
259. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
260. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
261. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977).
262. 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952). The Court noted:
It remains only to consider... the issue of whether, as a matter of federal due process, the
business done in Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and
of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corpora-














i ti t it ti i i t t i i l





) tit t ti lity.-The
f t's r rt t c:t l j i i ti l i i i .
ti
. t s lidated ining Co. 262
s sta tialit criteri as s sical l: f t
Isl
i i i t
t i
i t
i i l ti l
t r l r r , t t t il
ti i ,
i s l
259. elicopteros acionales e l ia, . . . all, . . , ( ).
. . . ).
. . , . . ).
. . . , ). h,~ t t :
It re ains only to consider ... the issue of hether, as a atter of federal due process, t e
i t tantial
f t r t r it i t t t in ti i t




cance attached to the property by either the defendant or the forum. For
example, a court could consider how much of their own worth defend-
ants have invested in a state and what proportion the property bears to
that worth. Courts making this inquiry will equalize treatment among
defendants. For some defendants with few resources, a relatively small
amount of property might seem more important. The size of the invest-
ment from a defendant's point of view would also bear on fairness be-
cause the investment's relative size could indicate whether the defendant
was aware of the property ownership, or whether such acquisitions rou-
tinely were made by an accountant, trustee, or employee.
F. A General Theme
Several basic threads run through these different aspects of general
jurisdiction. By hypothesis, general jurisdiction involves the adjudication
of a controversy that is centered outside the forum. For such controver-
sies, only a direct relationship between the forum and the defendant justi-
fies the imposition of the state's coercive power. That relationship does
not rest upon the state's right to regulate the outside activities, but on its
power over the individual directly. The defendant's local activities,
therefore, must be substantial enough to justify such power; they cannot
be sporadic or occasional, even though sporadic activities themselves
might be subject to local regulation when they are the source of the
dispute.
For instance, persons who travel into the forum are properly subject
to forum regulation of activities in which they engage during that so-
journ.263 Travel into the state, however, does not give the state the right
to regulate the travelers' activities elsewhere. Regulation of activities in
the forum invokes specific jurisdiction. Regulation of activities outside
the forum requires general jurisdiction, which in turn requires far more
extensive contacts between the forum and the individual than does spe-
cific jurisdiction. For instance, a state in effect may require an individ-
ual's consent to specific jurisdiction as a condition of driving or doing
business within the state. But a state may not reasonably require this
individual, as a condition for mere entry or occasional business, to con-
sent to general jurisdiction over litigation arising outside of the state.
Considering adjudicative jurisdiction in terms of the state's right to
regulate highlights a related choice-of-law problem: Under what circum-
263. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 (1938);
Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980) (holding that mere capacity to travel into a state is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction if business contacts are lacking).
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stances does an affiliation t6hat justifies general adjudicative jurisdiction
also justify the application of forum law? Although this question presup-
poses that general jurisdiction in a given case is appropriate, the answer
actually affects the determination whether adjudicative jurisdiction is ap-
propriate. If the forum has the right to apply its law, then local adjudica-
tion presumably may be a reasonable method towards that end. To
address this question, we next examine whether a direct affiliation suffi-
cient to support general adjudication also will support the application of
forum legislation.
III. The Choice-of-Law Implications of General Jurisdiction
Substantial affiliations that support general adjudicative power, such
as engaging in continuous and systematic business, may also in certain
circumstances support the application of local law. In such cases, we can
explain general adjudicative power, just as we explain specific adjudica-
tive power, in terms of implementing the right to regulate. Because those
substantial affiliations justify the state's regulation of the defendant's ac-
tivities elsewhere, the state may assert adjudicative jurisdiction. This di-
rect-affiliation justification for adjudicative jurisdiction then collapses
into the activities-regulation justification because both justifications ulti-
mately depend on contacts that give the state a right to regulate. By
definition, the contacts supporting general adjudicative jurisdiction are
unrelated to the subject matter of the litigation. Under what circum-
stances will these same contacts justify the application of forum law?
Adjudicativejurisdiction refers to a forum court's power to consider
a case, while a forum court's power to apply forum law is termed legisla-
tive or choice-of-law jurisdiction.264 When litigation concerns activities
within the borders of the fcrum and the court has specific adjudicative
jurisdiction, we will call the forum court's ability to apply forum law
specific legislative jurisdiction. Conversely, when litigation concerns ac-
tivities outside the borders of the forum, and when the forum only has
unrelated contacts with the litigating parties, we will call the ability of
forum courts to apply forur law general legislative jurisdiction.
We argue that general legislative jurisdiction should exist only when
the forum bears an appropriate unique affiliation 265 with the individual
264. See Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1587 (1978). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIc-T OF LAWS § 9 (1969) (describing limitations on a court's
choice of law); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 3, 56-64 (1968) (discussing legislative
jurisdiction and choice of law); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 9.2A, at 526-39 (describing due
process limitation on a state's choice of law and arguing that choice-of-law experimentation is lim-
ited by restrictions on the judicial jurisdiction of state courts).
265. See supra subpart H(A).
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General Jurisdiction
defendant. Four unique contacts--citizenship or domicile,266 primary
place of residence, place of incorporation, and principal place of busi-
ness-create forum rights that justify general legislative jurisdiction.
Nonunique contacts, on the other hand, should not give rise to general
legislative jurisdiction. The contacts that will support general adjudica-
tive jurisdiction, therefore, will support general legislative jurisdiction in
some cases but not others.
A. Legislative Jurisdiction To Apply Procedural Law
In cases involving conflict of state laws, the Supreme Court has em-
phasized that adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction must be distin-
guished, implying that separate constitutional standards exist for
evaluating each type of jurisdiction. The Court has held that the as-
sumption of adjudicative jurisdiction alone is insufficient to justify the
application of forum law.2 67 Similarly, a mere demonstration that a state
should have legislative jurisdiction is insufficient to justify state adjudica-
tive jurisdiction over a defendant.2 68
Adjudicative jurisdiction, however, automatically gives rise to legis-
lative jurisdiction over the procedural rules for activities within the
courts. Courts normally may apply their own rules of procedure, and
this practice makes sense if we characterize application of procedural
rules as specific legislative jurisdiction. Once a state becomes the forum,
it has direct contacts with all courtroom activity.2 69
Although the precise test for substance versus procedure is problem-
atic,270 a distinction does exist, at least in general terms. Substantive law
is law that governs actual rights and remedies. It creates the legal impli-
cations of conduct outside the courtroom. Conversely, procedural law
governs the structure of litigation; it dictates the rules within the court-
room. 27 1 At the very least, the forum's specific contacts with the con-
duct of the litigation allow it to apply purely procedural rules, rules that
indisputably have no substantive impact. Rules about the size of paper
on which motions must be filed or the hours during which the court will
hear cases presumably fall well within the pure procedure category. By
266. In the international context, the appropriate term would be "citizenship" or "nationality,"
while in the interstate context, the appropriate term would be "domicile."
267. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985) (forbidding state from using
its "assumption of [adjudicative] jurisdiction as an added weight in the scale when considering the
permissible constitutional limits on choice of substantive law").
268. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).
269. See generally L. BRILMAYER, supra note 71, at 249-65 (explaining the difference between
substance and procedure and why the forum has the right to apply its own procedural rules).
270. See id. at 250-52.
271. See id.
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virtue of its specific contacts with the process of litigation, however, the
forum also normally can apply rules with a clear procedural purpose,
even if they have some substantive impact. 272
B. Legislative Jurisdiction To Apply Substantive Law
Courts may apply the procedural law of the forum because adjudica-
tive jurisdiction creates specific forum contacts with the litigation process
in its courts. General adjudicative jurisdiction, however, presupposes
that the forum has no direct contacts with the subject matter of the litiga-
tion. Thus, courts cannot justify the application of the forum's substan-
tive law on the ground tha't general legislative jurisdiction derives from
the forum's right to regulate the conduct that spawns the dispute.
Rather, general legislative jurisdiction must emanate from some other
state right to regulate the behavior of the parties to the litigation.
Contrasting two Supreme Court choice-of-law cases may afford a
better understanding of the implications of general adjudicative jurisdic-
tion for choice of law. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 273 the defend-
ant was clearly subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum because it
carried on substantial business there. But, the majority of the plaintiff
class members had no relatitonship to the forum.274 The Court held that
the forum could not apply its law automatically to all the claims, but
must first perform a choice-of-law analysis to determine the applicable
law.27 5 Shutts presents an obvious case in which general adjudicative ju-
risdiction did not confer general legislative jurisdiction.
272. The power of federal courts to apply their procedural rules is particularly well established.
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), gives the Supreme Court power to establish gen-
eral rules for the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of
the federal courts. This authority is subject to the restriction that such rules shall not "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right." Id. Virtually every procedural rule has some substantive
impact; thus, the Court has held that the Act's prohibition was not intended to restrict "incidental
effects which necessarily attend the ac.option of new rules of procedure." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 465 (1965). The Hanna Court held that federal rules of procedure apply in diversity unless the
rule violates either the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution. See id. at 471. No rule yet has been
found to violate either of these restrictions, and courts have upheld applications of procedural rules
with substantive impact. See, eg., Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (holding
that federal law bars plaintiff from appealing a remittitur order that he has accepted); Hanna, 380
U.S. at 473-74 (applying federal rule 4 instead of state process rule despite its acknowledged impact
upon the defendant's substantive right to repose under state statute of limitations); Davis v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 611-12 (4th Cir.) (enforcing federal rule 15(c) and permitting relation
back of an amendment to a complaint in a diversity suit, which cured plaintiff's lack of capacity
even though state law would not have done so), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); see also R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, § 10.3, at 586-87 & n.84 (stating that after Hanna, all federal rules of
civil procedure probably will triumph over conflicting state rules).
273. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
274. See id. at 815.
275. See id. at 821-22.
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General Jurisdiction
In other cases, the facts that confer general adjudicative jurisdiction
also justify application of forum law. In Skiriotes v. Florida,276 the
Supreme Court held that Florida could apply its regulations on the re-
moval of sponges from the sea to a resident who conducted his activities
outside the territorial waters of the state. The Court recognized Florida's
right to regulate the activities of its own resident even when those activi-
ties occurred out of the state, a right derived solely from the state's pow-
ers in relation to its citizens. 277 The Court stressed that Florida's
exclusive relationship to the parties conferred unrestricted power to ap-
ply its law.278 The Skiriotes Court specifically distinguished Florida's re-
lationship with its citizens from the relationship of Massachusetts to the
parties in Manchester v. Massachusetts,279 in which the Court had denied
Massachusetts the right to enforce its regulations against Rhode Island
citizens in waters that were outside Massachusetts' territorial limits.2 80
1. The Costs of Legislative Jurisdiction. -At the outset, one may
wonder why the standards for general adjudicative jurisdiction ought to
be different from the standards for legislative jurisdiction. Both raise is-
sues of political fairness, and both involve a state's right to assert coer-
cive power over a protesting party. Adjudicative jurisdiction implicates
the state's right to compel an individual to defend litigation in its courts
and to comply with its procedures for resolving disputes. Legislative ju-
risdiction involves state regulation of an individual's out-of-court activi-
ties. One might think that once the state's coercive power is established,
it would carry with it both the right to adjudicate and the right to apply
its own law. State power, however, is not so unitary. Adjudicative and
legislative power differ in their implications and therefore require differ-
ent justifications.
The assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction only determines where a
case will be heard and what procedures will govern the litigation. The
assertion of legislative jurisdiction, on the other hand, determines the
cost of judgment or settlement for the parties. The differences between
the two are substantial. First, less is at stake with adjudicative jurisdic-
tion. The minimum contacts standards for adjudicative jurisdiction usu-
ally ensure that a party has some physical presence in the forum state.
276. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
277. See id. at 77.
278. The Court explained that "[n]o question as to the authority of the United States over these
waters, or over the sponge fishery, is here involved. No right of a citizen of any other state is here
asserted. The question is solely between appellant and his own state." Id. at 76.
279. 139 U.S. 240 (1893).
280. See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77.
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Even when a defendant is not actually present in the forum at the time of
litigation, modem transportation and communications resources make
participation in foreign litigation possible. Moreover, litigation is nor-
mally expensive in any state. Admittedly, a forum's exercise of adjudica-
tive jurisdiction may burden a defendant with extra costs of litigating in a
more distant, a more inconvenient, and a less familiar forum. Yet these
additional costs will be relatively small compared to the overall costs of
litigation. Where choice of law is not an issue, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens helps to prevent litigation where location is prejudicially in-
convenient to one of the parties.281
Much more is at stake with legislative jurisdiction. A party's cost
for application of state law can vary greatly from state to state. A fo-
rum's application of its own substantive law may result in a judgment
against the defendant that the law of another forum would not have im-
posed. 282 Rarely will the unique costs that attend litigation in a particu-
lar forum exceed the costs that attend the possibility of full judgment
against a party. The costs imposed by legislative jurisdiction include
both the cost of an actual judgment and the costs of an increase in the
opposing party's leverage in settlement negotiations. Although the
threat of forum location possibly may give a plaintiff some leverage in
settlement negotiations, the degree of leverage, absent some choice-of-law
281. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 n. 23 (1981) (stating that dismissal
is proper if the balance of convenience; suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessa-
rily burdensome for the defendant); Galf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947) (stating
that plaintiffs may not choose an inconvenient forum to inflict on defendants "expense or trouble not
necessary to [the] right to pursue [the] remedy"). To guide trial court discretion in deciding forum
non conveniens questions, the Supreme Court has set forth a list of "private interest factors" affect-
ing the convenience of litigants, see ia'. at 508, and a list of "public interest factors" affecting the
convenience of the forum, see id. at 50E -09. Private interests of the litigants include practical consid-
erations that may make trial easier, more expeditious, and less expensive. Public interests include
even distribution of administrative burdens among courts, local interest in deciding local controver-
sies, and the appropriateness of holding the trial in a forum that is accustomed to the state law that
must govern the case.
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), the Court considered
many of these factors in resolving a personal jurisdiction challenge. The Court considered the bur-
den upon the Japanese defendant both in terms of distance and the difficulty it would encounter
defending itself in a foreign legal system. See id. at 1034. The Court held that California had mini-
mal interest in resolving the matter and its courts were not suited to apply Japanese or Taiwanese
law to the dispute. See id. Thus, the Court arguably has incorporated many of the considerations
underlying forum non conveniens into the constitutional standard of jurisdiction.
282. Indeed, the classic choice-of-law cases present situations in which the application of the
forum's law results in a judgment exacly opposite to the one that would obtain under another state's
law. For example, the forum's substantive law may bar suits by wives against their husbands while
the substantive law of the marital dom:cile may allow such suits. Thus, if the wife can prove liability
and damages against the husband, the choice of one state's law over the other completely determines
whether the wife wins or is denied a day in court. An example of such a case is Sesito v. Knop, 297
F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961).
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General Jurisdiction
consequences attendant to the choice of forum, will be minimal com-
pared to the leverage caused by the threat of maximum judgment.
Our argument is not limited to the claim that adjudicative burdens
in foreign states are de minimis. More importantly, legislative jurisdic-
tion creates a zero-sum allocation of costs that generally is absent in ad-
judicative jurisdiction. A plaintiff normally will not gain from
adjudicative jurisdiction whatever a defendant loses when the litigation
takes place in a particular forum. While a plaintiff may prefer a forum
that the defendant dislikes, and while that forum may save a plaintiff
money and cost a defendant more, the plaintiff's benefits and the defend-
ant's costs rarely, if ever, will be proportionate because the defendant's
loss in cases of adjudicative jurisdiction does not determine the plaintiff's
gain. The most expensive forum for the plaintiff also may be the most
expensive forum for the defendant. Similarly, the benefits that a plaintiff
gains by selecting a place to litigate normally do not correlate to the
losses that a defendant incurs because of that selection.
In contrast, choice of law is zero sum; the plaintiff's gain is the de-
fendant's loss, and vice versa. Applying a law that benefits a plaintiff will
necessarily harm a defendant in exact proportion to that benefit. Pre-
sumably, plaintiffs will always choose the forum with law most advanta-
geous to them, and given the zero-sum nature of the choice-of-law
process, the defendant will bear the costs of this opportunity. While the
parties' common interest in avoiding mutually inconvenient forums al-
lows them to rule out such forums for adjudicative jurisdiction, the de-
fendant cannot rely on any common interest with the plaintiff to rule out
a truly irrational choice of law.
The plaintiff is likely to have only a few convenient forums. Setting
aside choice-of-law considerations, increasing the number of possibilities
beyond these few is unlikely to change the plaintiff's preferences or pres-
ent additional problems for defendants. Being subject to adjudicative ju-
risdiction in a large number of forums does not harm the defendant.
Assuming the plaintiff chooses a forum solely for convenience, multiply-
ing possible forums does not necessarily pose a threat to the defendant's
interests. The plaintiff will share with the defendant an interest in avoid-
ing the majority of potential forums that would be mutually inconve-
nient. In contrast, increasing the plaintiff's options as to legislative
jurisdiction necessarily imposes costs on defendants because of the zero-
sum nature of choice of law. The plaintiff has an incentive to choose the
law that is least advantageous to the defendant. Recent cases illustrate
that only when plaintiffs are able to forum shop for applicable law and
not just for forum location do they choose ridiculously inconvenient or
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Texas Law Review
disinterested forums.28 3
In this way, legislative jurisdiction creates a cumulative burden that
adjudicative jurisdiction does not create. This cumulative burden arises
in two important but distinct ways. First, given the larger costs imposed
by the assertion of legislative jurisdiction, the potential costs to be borne
by the defendant increase every time a state's law becomes available.
This result cumulates the potentially large costs of legislative jurisdiction.
Adjudicative jurisdiction lacks these costs because the total cumulative
effect of having more states with adjudicative jurisdiction is limited by
the relatively small difference between the most expensive and least ex-
pensive states in which the plaintiff might force the defendant to litigate.
The degree of benefit to the plaintiff and loss to the defendant resulting
from multiple forum choices is far less than the benefits and losses result-
ing from multiple substantive law choices.
The second cumulative burden caused by legislative jurisdiction is
the increased likelihood of different outcomes caused by the accumula-
tion of states with legislative jurisdiction. Even when the costs of litiga-
tion in different states vary for a defendant, having several states
available as potential forums itself adds no real burden because the possi-
bility of different litigation outcomes resulting from the choice of forums
will be negligible. Yet the varying approaches of different states to both
substantive law and choice-of-law rules increase the likelihood that the
plaintiff will shop for the forum with the substantive law most harmful to
the defendant, and consequently that the defendant will incur the maxi-
mum possible liability for the particular claim. Moreover, the ability of a
greater number of states to apply their own substantive law increases the
likelihood of conflict between these substantive laws; this concern is
wholly absent when several states have adjudicative but not legislative
jurisdiction.
283. For example, in Piper Aircraft, the plaintiff, as representative of the estates of several citi-
zens and residents of Scotland who were killed in an airplane crash in Scotland, brought a wrongful
death suit in a California state court against defendant manufacturers. The plaintiff sought to re-
cover under a negligence or strict liabilily theory, neither of which were recognized by Scottish law.
Plaintiff admitted that she filed the action in the United States because its laws of liability, capacity
to sue, and damages were more favorable to her position than those of Scotland. 454 U.S. at 240; see
also Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 798 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that although the "logical
place" for plaintiff to have brought her wrongful death action was New Jersey-where the defendant
was located and where the plaintiff and her husband resided at the time of his death-she was not
precluded from forum shopping in an eflbrt to find a more advantageous jurisdiction); cf. Ameritech
Mobile Communications, Inc. v. Cellular Communications Corp., 664 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D. I11.
1987) (noting that plaintiffs can choose any proper forum and that courts should not disturb the
choice if a transfer merely shifts rather than eliminates inconvenience to the parties); Heller Fin.,
Inc. v. Nutra Food, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1432, 1434-35 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (asserting that the plaintiff's
choice of forum will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of inconvenience to the defendant).
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General Jurisdiction
Thus, subjection to the legislative jurisdiction of a greater number of
states imposes burdens on parties that subjection to the adjudicative ju-
risdiction of those states does not. Given these burdens, the contacts
justifying general legislative jurisdiction should be greater than those
contacts that support general adjudicative jurisdiction. In cases of spe-
cific jurisdiction, the forum may justifiably apply its laws because an ac-
tivity has occurred within its borders. Generally, no other state can
show a greater right to apply its law, and the application of forum law is
not unfair to the parties who acted within the forum. In cases of general
jurisdiction, however, the relationship between the forum and the parties
must justify some state right to apply forum law to an extraterritorial
occurrence.
2. Unique Affiliations.-General legislative jurisdiction, therefore,
should derive only from a unique affiliation between a state and a party,
which gives that state a right to regulate all the party's activities regard-
less of where they might occur. Unique affiliations, because they are few,
do not pose the same threat of cumulative subjection to authority as do
nonunique affiliations. Only four relationships between a state and a
party meet the uniqueness test required for general legislative jurisdic-
tion: citizenship or domicile, primary place of residence, incorporation,
and principal place of business.
The first of these unique affiliations, citizenship, vests an individual
with the rights and privileges of political participation and state protec-
tion. These rights and privileges in turn justify individual duties of alle-
giance to the government and obedience to state law. A state can
regulate the activities of its citizens at home or abroad to protect and
benefit the interests both of the state and the citizens. As Justice Mc-
Kenna explained,
[T]he government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his
property wherever found and, therefore, has the power to make the
benefit complete.... [T]he basis of the power to tax was not and
cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property... but
upon [the defendant's] relation as citizen to the United States and
the relation of the latter to him as a citizen.284
Similarly, in Blackmer v. United States,285 the Supreme Court upheld an
act of Congress that required a citizen of the United States residing in
France to return in order to give testimony at trial. The Court explained
that "[h]e continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue of
284. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924).
285. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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Texas Law Review
the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority
over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a
foreign country. '286
The state rights present in the citizenship relationship also exist in
the relationship between a state and a company incorporated in the state.
Perhaps the greatest source of state rights in this relationship is the
state's creation of the corporation. 287 By allowing incorporation, the
state confers the privilege of limited immunity to shareholders and direc-
tors2 8 along with other tax and institutional benefits that vary from state
to state.289 By accepting these privileges, a corporation willingly submits
to the state's regulation of its behavior.290 Like citizens, a corporation
can enjoy the pleasures of its relationship to the state only if it accepts the
burdens the state imposes. Without a doubt, corporations rely on the
relative benefits and burdens of state corporation laws when deciding
where to incorporate. 291
Two other unique relationships, principal place of business and pri-
mary place of residence, also justify general legislative jurisdiction. Be-
cause principal place of business and primary place of residence are by
definition exclusive relationships, they will grant only one state an inter-
est in regulating corporate o:T individual activities beyond the state's bor-
ders. Only the unique contEcts of primary place of business or primary
place of residence will justify general legislative jurisdiction arising from
business activities or residence. The state of the principal place of busi-
ness will be the state offering the greatest privileges and benefits to the
business. 292 Likewise, the state of primary residence will be the state
286. Id. at 436. The Court determined that "one of the duties which the citizen owes to his
government is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testi-
mony whenever he is properly summoned." Id. at 438 (citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
281 (1919)).
287. Cf REVISED MODEL BusINSS CORP. ACT § 3.01(b) (1984) ("A corporation engaging in a
business that is subject to regulation under another statute of this state may incorporate under this
Act only if permitted by, and subject to all limitations of, the other statute.").
288. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, shareholders are not personally
liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except by reason of their own acts or conduct. See id.
§ 6.22(b). Directors are not liable for their official actions if they perform their duties in good faith
and with the care of an ordinary prudent person under similar circumstances. See id. § 8.30(d).
289. See generally N. LATrIN, LATrIN ON CORPORATIONS 65 (2d ed. 1971) (noting the practical
advantages of the corporation's legal personality).
290. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (1983) (providing that incorporation is available
for the conduct or promotion of lawful business). Federal law frequently treats place of incorpora-
tion as the place of citizenship. For example, in defining diversity jurisdiction, the United States
Judicial Code deems a corporation "a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated and of
the state where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
291. See supra note 58.
292. Professor Wright suggests that the rule for locating principal place of business "looks to the
place where the bulk of the corporate activity takes place, if there is any one state in which this is
true, while resorting to the location of the home office only if the corporation's activities are dis-
780
Vol. 66:721, 1988
HeinOnline -- 66 Tex. L. Rev.  780 1987-1988
tr ."286
. i
t l ti i t i
:
' 287 ti ,
t t t l rs
t 288 l
t t t .289 ,
t t t t ' l ti .290
t
it s ti
i t .291 .
l , l i .
i i l l
,
t r
. l t i ta t
l f r i ill j tif /legi l ti j i i ti i i
ss ill t st t ff ri t r t st ri il s fit t t
ss.292
. l . t . rt t r i t t f t ti i t iti t i
t i t t t i t
r is r rl ed." l . t ( iti l ir . it t t , . . ,
)).
287. J. I USI ESS . cr . ( ) ( ) (" r r ti i i
i t t is j t t r l ti r t r t t t t i t t i r r te t i
t l i itted , 10 ,
. l t r i r i i t rti l f i r r ti , r l r t ll
li l f r t t r t f t r r ti t r t ir t t. i .
§ 6.22(b). irectors are not liable for Iheir official actions if they perfor their ties i fait
it t i n t .
. r lly . iTl , "ITl I ( . ) ti t ti l
t t ti 's l l J: lit .
. , . ., . . tit. , ( ) ( ) i i t t i ti i il l
t t ti . r l t
ti t l f iti i . r l , i fi i i r it j ri i ti , t it t t
i i l r r ti iti t t i it i t
t st t r it s its ri i l l l: f si ess." . . . ( ).
. t .
. r fess r ri t s ests t at t e r le f r l cati ri ci al lace f si ess "I s t t e
l r t l f t r r t ti it t l , i t r i y t t i i t i i
tr , il r s rti t t l ti f t ffi l i t ti ' ti iti i
General Jurisdiction
from which an individual receives the greatest privileges and benefits of
residency; undoubtedly, the amount of time spent at a particular resi-
dence will be the critical element for determining this state.
Of course, a party's principal place of business may be in a state
other than the state of incorporation, or a party may be a citizen of one
state and have a primary place of residence in another state. Nonethe-
less, the four unique affiliations, citizenship, place of incorporation, pri-
mary place of residence, and principal place of business, at least can
minimize the chance that conflicts will arise by limiting the number of
states that could assert general jurisdiction.
Nonunique relationships should not support general legislative juris-
diction because of the costs this would impose on defendants. These rela-
tionships, such as a vacation residence or doing business, do not confer
the types of privileges and benefits on a party that unique affiliations
confer. Moreover, many states will have nonunique affiliations with a
particular person or legal entity; using such affiliations to support general
legislative jurisdiction would create the risk of cumulative or inconsistent
overlapping regulation. Making such relationships the basis of general
legislative jurisdiction also would encourage forum shopping and subject
parties to unpredictable and unfairly increased burdens from their activi-
ties. Many companies do business in all fifty states. Constitutional limi-
tations on choice of law293 would be rendered meaningless if any of the
fifty states could apply its law to all the activities of a company. Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts indicated that a
company does not acquiesce in application of forum law to all its activi-
ties across the nation simply because it engages in unrelated business ac-
tivities in the forum.294
Our argument that unique affiliations confer legislative jurisdiction
finds noteworthy support in a recent Supreme Court case dealing with
the proper reach of state law under the commerce clause. In CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of America,295 the Court upheld an Indiana law296
regulating tender offers for stock in Indiana corporations against a com-
merce clause challenge. The commerce clause argument relied upon a
plurality opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which invalidated a similar
Illinois statute for corporations that did a threshold amount of business
persed among several states and no one state clearly predominates." C. WRIGHT, supra note 176,
§ 27, at 153.
293. See supra note 19.
294. See 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985).
295. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
296. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West Supp. 1987).
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Texas Law Review
within the state.297 The CTS Court distinguished MITE on the grounds
that the Indiana law applied. only to local corporations, and remarked,
"So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporation it
has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
state." 298
CTS and MITE both involved statutes asserting general legislative
jurisdiction. Both laws regulated activities going on outside of the
state-the tender of stock--when the regulated party had the proper
statutory affiliation with the state. The only difference between the two
cases was that MITE rested on a nonunique affiliation, comparable to the
doing business test for adjudicative jurisdiction, while the CTS law in-
volved a unique affiliation, the place of incorporation. By affecting only
a unique affiliation, the law in CTS minimized or even eliminated the
possibility of cumulative or inconsistent regulation.
IV. Conclusion
We saw at the outset that domicile, place of incorporation, and prin-
cipal place of business were the paradigm bases for general adjudicative
jurisdiction. The reasons should now be clearer. These are relationships
so direct that they make fair the assertion of state adjudicative power or
legislative authority. They are unique affiliations that an individual or
legal entity normally will have with only one state.
These bases provide the standard for evaluating other bases for gen-
eral jurisdiction. Is an affiliation closely enough analogous to these
unique relationships that it justifies assertion of state power? Indeed,
several nonunique affiliations are similar enough to support general adju-
dicative jurisdiction. These nonunique affiliations, however, are inade-
quate to support state legislative power. Legislative power creates
greater cumulative burdens on a defendant than does adjudicative power.
These cumulative burdens make the central difference between unique
and nonunique affiliations-that a party may have many nonunique affil-
iations but will usually have only one of a particular unique affiliation-
crucial in the legislative jurisdiction context.
Both legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction must derive from the
fair exercise of state coercive power. General jurisdiction, of both sorts,
depends upon a particular sort of fairness. Unlike specific jurisdiction,
which derives from a state's. right to regulate local activities, general ju-
risdiction depends on the fairness of regulating the activities of insiders,
297. See 457 U.S. 624,'641-43 (1982).
298. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
782
Vol. 66:721, 1988







r -- en r
l
ti .





ti . i s






t t t t t ~~ ative . i l ti t
t l ti t t j i ti .
t t t i
l r filiation-
r i l i t l i l ti j i i tion t t.
ti




. . . ,' ).
. . t. t .
General Jurisdiction
regardless of where the activities occur. Although fairness in a given
case depends upon whether the state is only instructing the defendant to
appear in court or instead is imposing its rules upon the defendant's pri-
mary conduct, the basic principles underlying the exercise of both types
of general jurisdiction, adjudicative and legislative, remain the same.
This general view of general jurisdiction is born of a perspective founded
on a theory of the legitimate exercise of power by sovereign states.
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